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CONTENTS

Human Fertility and the Common Good. *Raymond H. Potvin* 217
Religion in Latin America. *Paul Bouchard* 231
Catholic Professors on the Non-Sectarian College Campus. *Helen Roach* 240
Modern Man and God. *John L. Murphy* 244

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
*Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., and John J. McCormick, S.S.*
Assisting at Mass by Television 272
Moral Problems of Plastic Surgery 274
Motets During Low Mass 277
The Angelus Bell 278
Lector's Blessing of Bread and New Fruit 279
Funeral Absolution During the Sacred Triduum 279
Directions for Congregation at Sung Masses 280

BOOK REVIEWS
Seven Books of Wisdom, *by Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm.* 282
Life after Death, *by Maurice Becqué and Louis Becqué* 283

BOOKS RECEIVED 286

Published monthly by The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 17, D. C. Subscription price in U. S. currency or equivalent: United States, Canada, $6.00, Foreign, $6.00, 60 cents per copy.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D. C.

Business communications, including subscriptions and changes of address, should be addressed to The American Ecclesiastical Review. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 17, D. C.

Please address all manuscripts and editorial correspondence to The Editor, The American Ecclesiastical Review, The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

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

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


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# HUMAN FERTILITY AND THE COMMON GOOD

Men are equal in dignity if not in capacity or possessions, and it is this very equality which at times paradoxically limits the expression of any one man's right, in the interest of the common good of all.[1] It is the main thesis of this paper that human reproduction, a responsible moral act, and consequently population growth, *can affect* the common good, and as such must be evaluated in that context as well as in the light of basic human rights.[2]

It is commonly agreed upon that "ideal fertility is rational fertility,"[3] and that rational behavior is responsible, regulated behavior; but there is little consensus upon what is rational and what is regulation. Socio-economic conditions cannot modify the intrinsic morality of the sexual act, or of specific forms of fertility regulation. Nevertheless, they are relevant to the total morality of reproductive behavior, and as such the dictate of reason applies *beyond* the individual's immediate circle and encompasses the effects of his acts upon the *social* order. This is crucial, for the social order, in turn, affects man's striving to fulfill his individual existential ends.

Three major arguments have been advanced in support of the thesis that family size is not subject to the common good: (1) There exists no problem and will exist no problem which can not be solved some other way; (2) Man's inalienable right to procreate is not subject to the needs of the socio-economic order; (3) The Holy See has spoken, hence no discussion is possible. The first argument is empirical, the second philosophical and the third theological. This points to the complexity of the issue under consideration and suggests that collaboration between theologians, philosophers and empirical scientists is imperative. The present

[1] What follows is a revised and expanded form of a paper presented at the American Catholic Sociological Society Meeting, 1960.

[2] For a contrary opinion, cf. Anthony Zimmerman, "Morality and Problems of Overpopulation," in *Proceedings: The Catholic Theological Society*, Buffalo, 1959 (Yonkers, New York: St. Joseph's Seminary, 1959), pp. 5-27.

[3] Leclercq and Hanley, *Marriage and the Family* (New York: Pustet, 1949), p. 211.

paper is but a brief outline of a more detailed investigation being planned for the near future.




FIGURE 1: THE ACCELERATING RATE OF WORLD POPULATION GROWTH

Source: *Population Bulletin*, December, 1960.

Whether or not one considers it a problem, the fact remains that the growth curve of human population shows a compound rate of increase. Whereas the average annual rate of growth was only about 0.3 per cent between 1650 and 1750, and 0.8 per cent from 1850 to 1950, it is now approximately 1.7 per cent. *Figure 1* portrays this in somewhat dramatic fashion.[4] Not only is the

[4] Statistics and Figure 1 are taken from "World Population," *Population Bulletin*, XVI (Dec., 1960), p. 157. The average non-demographer is often confused by the different statistics used to describe population growth. Depending on the purpose and the data available, demographers usually measure growth in three ways: (a) as an observed change in the total number of people; (b) as a current process of replacement; or (c) as a change in the size of some sections of the population, such as age groups. We wish to thank the *Population Bulletin* for permission to reproduce Figures 1 and 3.

present rate unprecedented, but it is increasing. In most parts of the world mortality is declining while fertility remains at a fairly high level. Even if the rate of growth should remain fairly constant, there would result a net *increase,* since the base is constantly being enlarged. In effect this means that at present rates, 50 years from now (2010), world population would more than double and reach approximately 6.5 billion; in 100 years (2060), it would grow to 15 billion, more than five times the present total. No one knows whether this will happen actually, but it *will* if the present spread between birth and death rates does not change. It is obvious that this process cannot go on indefinitely, since there is a maximum population (whatever it may be) which the limited resources of this earth (whatever they may be) can support adequately (whatever that may be). It is most prudent therefore to support serious study in these areas.

### FALSE SOLUTIONS

It is not a solution to dismiss the matter by insisting that the current high rates of increase will decline automatically, since the net reproduction rate tends to rise during the initial phases of improved mortality but will eventually revert to earlier levels with the aging of the population.[5] In fact, without a change in fertility and mortality rates, the age structure of a closed population—one where there is no migration—becomes stable, and the population grows at a constant rate.[6] An aging population is not necessarily the long range effect of a decline in mortality. If two stable populations are compared, each having approximately the same birth rate but two different death rates, one three times as high as the other, the age composition is approximately the same. For no age group is there more than a slight difference. It may sound strange but the fact remains that *mortality* is relatively unimportant in comparison with *fertility* as a factor influencing age composition.[7] This has been misunderstood quite often, even by some demographers, but recent analyses of stable populations have

[5] Zimmerman, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

[6] Cf. George W. Barclay, *Techniques of Population Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 203-240; and Thomas K. Burch, "Facts and Fallacies About World Population Growth," *The Catholic World* (March, 1960), pp. 346-351.

[7] Barclay, *op. cit.,* p. 228.

shown quite clearly that changes in age structure are the result of changes in fertility levels, and not so much the result of changes in mortality.

Nor is it true that "when peoples make the transition from rural subsistence economies with high mortality to highly industrialized patterns of production with low mortality, the gross reproduction rate slides into a gradual decline."[8] There is no necessary connection between the two. The historical slowing down of population increase in some Western industrialized societies was due to declining fertility which resulted from a complex web of factors. Recent research in this area points to significant differences in reproduction which exists between countries, even within so homogeneous a cultural area as Western Europe; all the more so, therefore, between Western Europe and the countries of other continents.[9] Not only is it highly questionable that modern life has brought about a decline in fecundity, but in some cases industrialization has been and is an occasion for a *rise* in fertility. Whenever fertility has dropped, it has not been automatic, but mainly the result of family limitation through celibacy, retarded marriage or some form of control within marriage. Any projection of future population is by nature hypothetical, and presupposes many assumptions which may or may not be realized in the future; long-term population projection is a risky business. Nevertheless, there does not exist an automatic check to population growth and problems could arise if present trends continue for very long.

| *Category of Countries* | *Calories per Capita* | *Income per capita (U.S. dollars equivalent per annum)* | *Industrial Investment per Worker (Index = 100)* | *Physicians per 100,000* | *Life Expectancy at Birth* | *Illiteracy (in percent)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Underdeveloped .. | 2,150 | $ 41 | 11 | 17 | 30 | 78 |
| Intermediate ..... | 2,760 | 154 | 39 | 78 | 52 | 20 |
| Developed ..... | 3,040 | 461 | 100 | 106 | 63 | 5 |

FIGURE 2: FOOD SUPPLY, ECONOMIC, HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL INDEXES FOR UNDERDEVELOPED, INTERMEDIATE, AND DEVELOPED AREAS.

[8] Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[9] For a concrete example, cf. William Petersen, "The Demographic Transition in the Netherlands," *The American Sociological Review*, XXV (June, 1960), 334-347.

Source: *The Point Four Program,* Publication 3347: Economic Cooperation Series 23, Department of State (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949).

Whether or not this will happen is still of minor concern as compared to relative population pressure. There exists at the present time an *imbalance* between concentration of peoples and resources. *Figure 2* shows that underdeveloped countries are in trouble from many angles, whether calorie intake, per capita income, industrial investment, or education are taken as criteria. For the most part, it is precisely in those countries where economic prospects are least favorable that population is increasing most rapidly.[10] According to the medium assumption, a middling estimate which avoids extremes in projecting growth, it is estimated that between 1960 and 1975, Latin America will experience an annual rate of *increase* from 24 to 28 per thousand, Asia from 17 to 23 per thousand, and Africa from 16 to 17 per thousand: "This would mean a net annual addition rising from 37-38 million in 1960 to nearly 64 million in 1975 for the underdeveloped world as a whole, compared with a rise from 10 to 11 or so million a year in the more developed regions."[11] In other words this serious imbalance has more than a good chance of becoming aggravated in the near future. In 1975, according to the assumptions of the medium projection, almost 70 per cent of the world's people will be concentrated in the economically less developed areas.

### PAPAL TEACHING

Papal encyclicals have repeatedly called the Christian world's attention to these problems and have demanded a reorganization of world economy. Pope Pius XII in his Christmas Message of 1952 proclaimed that "solidarity among nations demands the cessation of glaring inequalities in living standards, and so also in financial investment and in the degree of productivity of human labor."[12] He called for a lowering of anti-migration barriers, greater

[10] Cf. "The Race Between People and Resources," *Population Bulletin,* XV (August, 1959), 81 ff.; "Population Inflation Shrinks the Earth," *Ibid.,* XIV (June, 1958), 61 ff.; "Catholic Institute Seeks Solution to Population Pressures in Underdeveloped Areas," *Ibid.,* XII (Feb., 1956), 1 ff.

[11] Richard M. Fagley, *The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 32.

[12] *AAS,* 20, 38.

international trade, more capital assistance and the distribution of surplus foods. More efficient organization and utilization of the world's resources can support adequately the world's population for years to come, but the redistribution of resources needed is a serious problem which can only become aggravated if the present rates of population growth continue at their present high levels in the underdeveloped countries. Papal statements are realistic guides for action, not an invitation to pious withdrawal and unconcern. Reorganization is imperative, but reorganization is subject to socio-economic and demographic laws.

International migration can help to relieve some of the population pressure in certain areas of the world, but it cannot resolve the problem.[13] For example South America, which has the largest natural resources, has difficulty absorbing its own rapidly increasing population given the weak economy of many of its countries. Adding to the labor pool is no help at the *present* stage of growth. Besides the sheer number involved is staggering. Transportation in terms of facilities and cost are simply not available.

Disposal of surplus food from the more favored areas is another solution. Nevertheless, not enough is being produced and increased production for foreign consumption would profoundly affect existing economies. It would tend "to disrupt normal trade and markets, and at times cause hardship in the receiving countries unless carefully channelled into relief and welfare purposes."[14] Intensive agricultural development within needy countries is a must, and an extensive aid program will give results. However many of these nations have only small reserves of arable land, either because unused land is not suitable or else requires expensive technical operations for cultivation, operations which cannot be initiated at the present time because of lack of capital. Given the high rate of population growth, these countries are consuming the results of increased food production and retarding needed advance in agricultural productivity.

Food is not the only problem. Increased industrialization is im-

[13] William J. Gibbons, in *Proceedings: The World Population Conference, Summary Report* (New York: United Nations, 1955), p. 161.

[14] William J. Gibbons, "World Population and Food Supply," in *The 1960 National Catholic Almanac* (Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony's Guild, 1960).

perative if international trade is to be increased. These people need schools to acquire new skills, they need equipment for farms and industries and new sources of power, all operations requiring large capital investment. The amount of money needed to finance these projects is enormous and cannot be raised by the more prosperous nations alone, because these in turn need large investments at home. Any "faltering in the economy of the developed countries limits the markets of the underdeveloped countries and injures them more than anyone else."[15] A substantial part of the capital required must come from the underdeveloped country itself and can be accumulated only through saving. And yet the faster the population grows, the smaller the share of annual income available to raise the level of consumption or to invest in order to increase productivity. In a developed country, capital demands and large populations are stimuli for economic growth; but these can be and often are excessive strains upon the economy of labor surplus countries:[16]

> A population growing at 1 per cent a year needs to invest something like 4 to 5 per cent of its national income merely to maintain its wealth-population ratio. An investment rate of 8 to 10 per cent a year is required to enable a population to grow 1 per cent a year and at the same time experience an increase of something like 1 per cent a year in per capita income, unless technological progress is very great and not very capital-absorbing. If the growth rates are doubled—that is if both the population and the per capita income grow at 2 per cent a year—the required investment rates become 16 to 20 per cent a year. Such rates have not often been achieved even in the high per capita income industrial countries.[17]

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[15] Paul G. Hoffman, *One Hundred Countries: One and One Quarter Billion People* (Washington, D. C.: Albert D. and Mary Lasker Foundation, 1960), p. 23.

[16] Cf. United Nations, *Report on the World Situation* (New York, 1957).

[17] "Population Growth and Economic Development," *Population Bulletin*, XVI (March, 1960), 32. Figure 3 is taken from page 33 of this issue, and it points dramatically to the inverse relationship between rapid population growth and ability to save in a hypothetical population with $65 a year per capita income, $61 being used for consumption and $4 for savings and investment. It is further assumed that half of any increase of per capita income will be consumed, and half devoted to savings, and that the capital-output ratio is 2.5.

*Figure 3* is an attempt to show this graphically, and points to the stark reality that population growth is intimately connected with the problems now facing these countries, and that socio-economic reorganization must take this into account.




FIGURE 3: INCOME PER CAPITA, SAVINGS AND POPULATION GROWTH.
Source: *Population Bulletin,* March, 1960.

It is for this reason that human fertility, and consequently the act of reproduction, is linked to the common good. Population growth can affect positively or negatively the *characteristics of society* in which man fulfills his destiny. It affects more precisely the sufficiency of exterior goods required by a stable social order. Such is the nature of the common good, that it is made up of many elements, principally of the intellectual and moral good of virtue, but instrumentally of those external goods needed by a well constituted society.[18] More precisely it is the ordering of the social

[18] *I-II,* q. 96, art. 1, c. This paper is concerned with a practical and instrumental common good, but one which must be effectively attained if the principal common good or moral good of virtue is to be achieved. It is concerned with the common good of specific communities as eventually related to the common good of humanity.

so that every member might enjoy the *possibility* of realizing his perfection and his eternal beatitude by participating in a common co-operative effort. It is "a system of advantages and utilities but also a rectitude of life, an end, a good in itself or, as the Ancients expressed it, a *bonum honestum*."[19] The whole of man is engaged in it as well as the whole of society. It is the responsibility of each and every one, and it is the responsibility of the community as such.

The common good cannot be purchased at the expense of the human personality nor can it gain anything by hampering man's pursuit of his existential ends. Society is a whole, made up of wholes, and man is not ordained to it according to all that he is and has.[20] Nevertheless, all of man's operations are fittingly referred to it as the part is to the whole.[21] This is not an easy paradox to solve, but it is at the root of our discussion. Man is a part of and inferior to the social, by reason of his deficiencies and those things in and of him which depend upon it. It is in the order of terrestrial values that the *good of the community* is superior to the good of the individual, even though these values are not equal to the dignity and the destiny of man. It is in this sense that he is bound to serve the community. But by reason of his relationship to things more important than the common life, man is *above* the social, and it is in this sense that the community must serve him. On this subject Maritain writes most eloquently:

> Thus it is in the nature of things that man, as part of society, should be ordained to the common good and the common work for which the members of the city are assembled. It is in the nature of things that he should as the need arises renounce activities which are nobler in themselves than those of the body politic for the salvation of the community. It is also in the nature of things that social life should impose numerous restraints and sacrifices upon his life as a person, considered as a part of the whole. But in the measure that these sacrifices and restraints are required and accepted in the name of justice and amity they raise higher the spiritual level of the person.[22]

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[19] Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good* (New York: Scribner's and Sons, 1947), p. 43.

[20] *I-II*, q. 21, art. 4, c.

[21] *I-II*, q. 96, art. 4.

[22] Maritain, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

FURTHER QUESTION

The first part of this paper attempted to show that it is possible for population growth to affect the socio-economic order, an order upon which man depends most intimately for the fulfillment of his destiny. The common good in turn—of which this order is an instrument—requires of man even the sacrifice of acts nobler than itself so that he might raise himself to his true stature. Could it not then require that he limit births rationally and licitly according to the laws of God and nature, if the situation is such that for most men the "perfect sufficiency of life" is not attainable otherwise?

This question in no way implies that the state might so require, for the common good and the state are not one, though the former is the proper object of concern of the latter. It is not within the rights of the state to make permission to marry or to make the use of the sexual act in marriage depend upon conditions which it cannot enforce unless it violate personal rights and liberties. It could however encourage and educate man to recognize his responsibilities. And here is the crux of the matter. Man has rights and he has responsibilities. The social order must guarantee both, and to effect such an order, man must at times sacrifice the *exercise* of some of his rights.

It is often asserted that a right is "the power to do, to have or to claim something free from interference by others."[23] In effect, rights *do* establish spheres of autonomy, and rights concerned with goods of a higher rank—goods related to ends more essential for the perfection of man—always prevail over rights of less importance. And so it might be argued that the right to procreate is of a higher rank than the material well-being of society. This may very well be, but since "on a good of minor importance may depend the actualization, later on, of goods much more indispensable in regard to existential ends, then a second principle, that of emergency, comes into play: in such cases rights protecting the lesser goods and the duties related to them prevail."[24] Though man and the family are prior to the larger community and though

[23] J. Messner, *Social Ethics,* translated by J. J. Doherty (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), p. 151.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

the social order exists for them, it is not a reversal of the hierarchy of things to limit births licitly in the hope of reconstructing society should population pressures ever be so great as to prevent that society from serving man and the family adequately.

It is well to remember that canon 1013 of the code of canon law insists that "the primary end of marriage is the procreation and education of children," and canon 1113 adds that parents are obliged not only to provide for their "religious and moral education" but their "temporal welfare" as well. This means more than mere subsistence. The parents need a stable socio-economic *order* if they are to accomplish this responsibility; and that is why the duty and right to procreate is conditioned upon the needs of the community as well as upon the needs of the immediate family circle.

### IS THE QUESTION SETTLED?

Another objection frequently encountered is that the hierarchy and the Sovereign Pontiffs have spoken with authority and that debate is closed. There is no doubt that they speak with authority, but there still remains, for serious scholars, the obligation to understand and interpret precisely what has been said. Truth is not served either by minimizing or overextending their words.

For example, the recent statement by the American Hierarchy, *Explosion or Backfire,* is a forceful document against artificial birth control and the smoke screen that is sometimes created to foist a moral evil upon the public. While emphasizing the need for reconstructing the social order, the document does not reject categorically the eventual possibility of a "population explosion." The bishops do insist, however, that "experts . . . have not yet reached agreement on the exact meaning of this phrase. It is still a hypothesis that must stand the test of science. . . ."[25] They condemn the proposition that birth control as such can solve the problems facing underdeveloped nations; they do not condemn the proposition that population growth is intimately connected with socio-economic conditions.

Recently Pope John XXIII and the Roman Pontiffs before him have stressed the blessings of large families, and have rendered hommage to those parents who make the necessary sacrifices

[25] "Explosion or Backfire," *Population Bulletin,* XVI (Jan. 1960), 21.

to rear such families. The texts are many and there is no need to cite them, but it is well to remember the context in which they were spoken or written, and the audience to whom the words were addressed. At no time do the Pontiffs advocate irresponsible action, nor intimate that offspring have to be the maximum possible. Counsels are not obligations, and even counsels are subject to circumstances. Moreover Pope Pius XII in the same allocution to the midwives in 1951 wherein he extols the virtues of a large family adds: "The Lord has created all other things on earth for man, and so far as his being and his essence are concerned, man has been created for God, and for no other creature, although so far as his activity is concerned he has *obligations* toward the community."[26]

The argument that life is the first of all goods and that it is better to be than not to be has no validity in this context. It is true that created being adds to the external glory of God, but by the simple fact that it is external, it is relative and the act of procreation is subject to evaluation in terms of circumstances. Though for some particular person, existence is better than non-existence, "the validity of this argument starts, so to say, only at the moment of the child's conception. Prior to his conception, however, it is not the advantage of this individual, who as yet does not exist, that must be considered, but rather the advantage of the human race."[27]

Perhaps the papal text cited the most frequently to support the thesis that the needs of the community are not sufficient reason to limit births is one of Pius XII in his Christmas Message of 1952:

> Certainly we will not deny that this or that region is at present burdened by a relatively excessive population. But the desire to solve the difficulty with a formula that the number of inhabitants should be regulated *according to the public economy* is equivalent to subverting the order of nature, and the entire psychological and moral world which is bound up with it.[28]

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[26] Pius XII, *Address to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives: October 29, 1951* (N.C.W.C. edition, 1951), pp. 5-6.

[27] Leclercq and Hanley, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

[28] *AAS*, 20, 42. (Italics added.)

In effect, does this amount to saying that deliberate population control is necessarily illegitimate? A careful reading of the original text precludes reaching such a conclusion. In the first place the Pope is speaking of regulation according to the public economy. The Italian phrase is *secondo la economia publica, "secondo"* coming from the Latin deponent verb *sequor* meaning "to follow." It implies a certain subordination as in the phrase "regulation according to law." The text condemns regulation of birth which is subordinated to the economy, but it says nothing of regulation concomitant with economic reorganization for the solution of human problems. The fact that Pius XII did not speak of this refinement does not preclude its being advanced as a solution, just as the lack of papal pronouncements on rhythm before its discovery did not preclude its subsequent acceptance by the Church as a legitimate way of limiting births under certain specified conditions. As empirical science progresses and reveals more specifically the dynamic interrelationship between population growth and the stability of the socio-economic order, then the papal statements may refer to that link. In the meantime the statements of the Popes are primarily concerned with reaffirming the dignity of man and warning against his subordination to any material system.

## CONCLUSION

Man is a troubling paradox. His vision and his destiny span and soar far above the things of this earth, but he remains bound by that order created for him. He is a whole and yet a part. He surpasses society while being subject to it; the common good exists for him though he must serve it. One of man's greatest responsibilities is the propagation of the human race; one of his noblest acts is the procreation of his children. It is noble because it is rational and responsible. Man is incapable of fulfilling his destiny and guaranteeing that of his progeny unless he strive to maintain a socio-economic order which will serve the vision of his own greatness. If it does not, that order must be changed, for only then will his fullness be realized.

It must be changed, not with dreams or wishful thinking, but through study and manipulation of the socio-economic laws that make society the reality it is. More and more, scientists are discovering the dynamic interplay between population growth and

economic growth. Some have rung falsely and prematurely the alarm bell; others have refused to face the reality of a finite world. The fact remains that in certain areas of the earth, population pressures are mounting and resources are not available. The more fortunate must help, a more equitable distribution of the goods of the world must be effected, but the efficiency of all relief measures is closely related to the rate of population growth. If science can pinpoint more accurately the nature of this dynamism, then men in those areas have no moral alternative but to take it into account.

Reduction of fertility cannot of itself solve the urgent problems of impoverished lands. In this, many of the neo-malthusians are in error. But in some circumstances it can help to increase the efficiency of constructive measures which otherwise might be doomed to failure. To that extent it is conceivable that man has an obligation to limit births in accordance with the laws of God and of nature, so that the socio-economic order can speedily be reorganized and function for the greater perfection of man himself and of his children.

RAYMOND H. POTVIN

*The Catholic University of America*
*Washington, D. C.*

# RELIGION IN LATIN AMERICA

Christianity reached the shores of the New World, in 1492, in the caravels of Christopher Columbus. Later, as America was being explored and occupied by the Spaniards and the Portuguese, the missionaries implanted in our soil the universal religion—*katholikos*—in Greek—founded fifteen centuries earlier by Christ and his Apostles, established by Peter in Rome.[1]

From the colony of Hispaniola, the Spanish Isle, where Catholicism first took root, the religion of Christ spread to all the regions of America and the saga of its diffusion fills up one of the most brilliant chapters in the history of Christendom since the conversion of the Barbarians, after the fall of Rome, to Christian civilization.

The Spanish and Portuguese missionaries boldly rushed to the conquest of souls through the incredible extent of an unknown continent where neither the unhealthy jungles nor the most abrupt mountains, neither the cruel paganism of the civilized peoples nor

[1] In regard to the entire history of this problem, cf.: Carlos Pereyra, *Historia de la América Española* (Madrid, 1920-1925); Antonio Ybot Leon, *La Iglesia y los Eclesiasticos españoles en la empresa de Indias* (Barcelona: Salvat, 1954); Demetrio Ramos Pérez, *Historia de la colonizacion española en América* (Madríd: Pegaso, 1947); Mariano Cuevas, S.J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México,* 5 vols. (Mexico City, 1947); Salvador de Madariega, *Cuadro historico de las Indias* (Buenos Aires, 1945); Romulo D. Carbina, *Historia eclesiastica del Rio de la Plata,* 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1914); Constatino Bayle, S.J., *Espana en Indias* (Madrid, 1939); *Idem, La Cruz y el dolar; La propaganda protestante en la América Española* (Madrid, 1961); Fernando de Armas Medina, *Cristianizacion del Peru* (Sevilla, 1953); Mariano Picon Salas, *De la conquista a la independencia* (Mexico City, 1944); Pedro Henriquez Ureña, *Historia de la cultura en la América Hispanica* (Mexico City, 1947); Juan Agustin Garcia, *La ciudad indiana* (Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1933); José Maria Valega, *El Virreinato del Peru* (Lima, 1939); Julio Jiménez Rueda, *Historia de la cultura en México* (Mexico City, 1950); Juan de Solorzano y Pereira, *Politica Indiana* (Madrid, 1930); *Recopilacion de las Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias* (Reedicion de Madrid, 1943); Richard Pattee, *El catolicismo contemporaneo en Hispano-América* (Buenos Aires: Fides, 1951); Fernando de Azevedo, *A civilizaçâo brasileira* (São Paulo, 1944); Pedro Calmon, *Historia social do Brasil,* 3 vols. (São Paulo, 1941).

the suspicious ferocity of the wild tribes could stop their zeal. While the sedentary pagans were taught the high human and spiritual values of Christianity, the savages had their minds opened to the knowledge of God and the benefits of civilization. The monks were also great architects, and the churches and convents they built exerted on the spirituality and culture of nascent America an influence comparable to that of the monasteries of Europe during the barbarian and dark ages that came after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire.

From the beginning of colonization, the evangelization of Hispanic America by the Catholic Church has been paralleled, during three centuries, by a cultural and artistic expansion unparalleled in any part of the world settled by the Europeans.

In every important city, the missionaries opened schools and colleges for the benefit of the Indians and Mestizos as well as for the Creoles and Europeans. The natives were taught the arts and sciences of Europe in such famous institutions as the school founded in Texcoco by Fray Pedro de Gante and the Imperial College of Santa Cruz in Mexico. American ethnography and linguistics were soon created by friars like the Franciscan, Fray Bernardino de Sahagun, and when the first universities of America were inaugurated in Mexico and Lima, the teaching of quechua and nahuatl took its place along with Latin. In the field of architecture and the fine arts, where is the region, outside Hispanic America, that can be compared with those countries that were adorned by the Church with beautiful temples and monuments? Are not the states, which were carved out of the vice-royalties of Mexico and Peru, alone in possessing, in America, an artistic evolution comparable to that of Europe from the end of the Gothic and the beginning of the Renaissance down to the fantastic splendors of the Mexican baroque art of the Eighteenth Century?

However, the incomparable success of the Catholic Church in America, under the Empire of Spain and Portugal, does not find its only explanation in the fervent zeal of the clergy sent overseas or trained on the American soil. It lies in this important fact that Catholicism, integrant part of the great Hispanic civilization, was also the religion most accessible and adaptable to the mentality of the aborigines.

The religion of the Mayas, the Aztecs and the Incas was sumptuous and lavish in its use of all the resources of Art. The indigenous civilizations had worked out complicated liturgies. The Amerindians were fond of their solemn feasts, the ritual dances, the chants, the endless pageants of priests and their attendants winding around the temples of the Sun and the pyramids of Kukulcan. The Spaniards understood very well the habits of mind of their new subjects and in the New World Catholic cult became more pompous than in Europe. The Indians were deeply religious and so were the Spaniards. The processions, the liturgical ceremonies, the singing of hymns and psalms enchanted their lives. They embellished their cities with innumerable churches, the naves of which were glowing with gold behind richly carved porticoes. At the end of the colonial era, Catholicism had penetrated everywhere outside the inaccessible jungles and touched most of the aboriginal nations. Spain and Portugal had transformed their imperial domain into a Catholic continent.

### THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE REPUBLICAN ERA

What was to be the fate of the powerful Catholic Church after the independence of the Spanish colonies and Brazil? Let us point out first that the building of churches and the brilliant evolution of religious art came to an end after the departure of Spain and Portugal from the American shores. Perhaps because the artistic impulse had originated from Europe? Perhaps should we rather see the consequences of the Wars of Independence that impoverished the Church and ruined for many years the young republics which were going to be the theatre of civil strife, of social, political and economic instability. Moreover, the new standards of life, the new sources of social standing, the poverty of the illiterate masses, the lack of public education or its secularization, the anti-clerical persecutions hampered the recruitment of the clergy and slowed down the action of the Church, impeding her to maintain the institutions of social welfare that were her responsibility during the colonial regime.

Although Hispanic America has experienced, since the republican era, the government of several irreligious and agnostic presidents; although certain countries have been overwhelmed for a while by violent anti-clerical movements, the immense majority of Latin

Americans are still faithful to the religion founded by Christ and His Apostles. Thus, in spite of the weakening strength of the Church during the nineteenth century, the civilization of Spanish and Portuguese America remains fundamentally Catholic.

Nevertheless, the times are changing and, in the middle of the twentieth century, it does not seem irrelevant to find out if Catholicism will preserve the pre-eminent position acquired during the preceding four hundred years.

The struggle between the rival powers of State and Church has come to an end in the Latin countries. The Church has renounced any move to influence politics or maintain an exclusive control on public education. The anti-clericalism of the past and present centuries is fading away and has never threatened seriously to modify the Catholic character of Latin America. But, as she was rapidly recovering from her wounds, two powerful forces coming from abroad, and basically distinct in their aims, entered into Latin American life, and are presently vigorously attempting to promote their own individual goals. It is strange, however, that in the minds of many Latins these two forces—Russian Communism and North American Protestantism—are closely linked insofar as they both appear to give the outward impression that their chief goal is the same, namely the destruction of the Catholic Church in Latin America.

## SOURCE OF CONFUSION

The activity of Communism is obviously more radical, since it aims at the eradication of all religions. Marxism, however, preferably attacks Catholicism, because it is the traditional and preponderant faith of the Latin masses, the Creed most intimately linked with their civilization, while the other cults represent a foreign influence still negligible in most of the Hispanic nations. Communism is for the Church a redoubtable enemy, as its activity is invisible in the secrecy of cells and organizations that escape the vigilance of non-Communists.

Very different is the action of North American Protestantism. It comes in the name of religion. Without realizing it, however, it has created the image in the popular mind of a Big Money Operation, in which an enormous capital is invested. This, linked to

its open attack upon Catholicism, has given it the look of an out-and-out offensive. Its first aim seems to be the imposition of the Protestant presence everywhere, even in far away places where there is no congregation. Quite often in miserable Indian villages a couple of thatched houses can be seen with a small painted board over the door. The inscription points out to the passer-by that this is not an ordinary house but a *"capilla evangélica,"* and *"Yglesia de Dios,"* a *"templo adventista,"* and the like. Even though hardly anyone frequents these huts, they are there to remind the native that other religions exist apart from Roman Catholicism. The purpose seems to be that every Latin American must be made aware that besides the twice millennial religious tradition he belongs to, besides the Church established by the Son of God, he may choose between two dozen other religions founded since the discovery of America. Even the primitive dwellers of the jungle, who will have to live in the Catholic nations of Latin America, once they are assimilated to our civilization, are reminded that they must make up their minds and decide if they will become Northern or Southern Baptists, Episcopalians, Quakers, Seventh Day Adventists, Latter Day Saints, Jehovah's Witnesses, or Christian Scientists. Except for the "snake cults" of isolated regions, and the white mink coat mysticism of Prophet Jones and Father Divine, a full array of U. S. creeds is now offered to our neighbors to the south.

All of this has a strange reaction on the Latin mind. Three years ago, in Guatemala, I was on my way to visit the pre-Columbian city of Tikal. Our plane landed at Flores, capital of the department of Petén. As I was looking at the peons loading aboard bales of chicle, a gentleman greeted me in English, obviously from the United States. I presumed that he was an agent for a chewing gum firm and added: "Since you are living in Flores, I suppose you must be in the chicle business." "No," he said, "I am a missionary." A few minutes later another man from the States reflected what I learned was also the mind of the natives: "What's that fellow doing in this jungle? These people don't need him."

In this way I discovered at once, as soon as I reached Central America, the omnipresence of North American Protestantism, and, in front of its all-pervading aggressiveness, the reaction of North American Catholicism. After this meeting I made a deliberate effort later while travelling through the isthmian republics to find

out the response of Latin American Catholicism to the religious challenge coming from the United States.

### LATIN AMERICAN REACTION

It may be said, in all honesty, that never in my life had I heard so many denunciations of Protestantism not only from the pulpit but in private conversations as well. Everywhere I went, I listened to people inveighing against the religious imperialism of the United States, against the "purchase of souls by the Almighty Dollar." It was obvious that most of the Catholics, even the lukewarm and indifferent believers, felt outraged by the proportions of such an indiscreet onslaught against the traditional faith which is, in their minds, so intimately linked to their proper civilization. Msgr. Gustavo Francheschi reflects the general view well:

> As to Protestantism, we feel obliged to emphasize that the British, German, Swedish and Norwegian members of the Reformed Churches who have formed their own congregations in the Argentine Republic and have opened churches, never undertook anti-Catholic campaigns: they were satisfied with maintaining their different confessions. The same cannot be said of the North Americans belonging to various sects: from one end of our country to the other, they wage an implacable war against the Church and go to the extreme of denouncing the Catholics as pagans. We must not be surprised consequently if, after a long silence, the Argentine bishops have raised their voice to point out the danger and to ask their brethren to counteract that destructive campaign. We must take into consideration that the propaganda to which I have referred does not usually make Protestants, but *unmakes Catholics,* for it is infinitely more negative than positive.[2]

Of course, the anti-Protestant reaction varies accordingly to the extent of the zeal and the degree of education in the different social classes; but it is found everywhere. The very devout and older Catholics are naturally inclined to see in the sudden North American fury to deconvert and decatholicize Hispanic America an enterprise that is not inspired by Christ but by the Devil, some sort of spiritual rape of the Latin republics. All the old prejudices against the Protestants and the Gringos come to the surface and

[2] Mgr. Gustavo Francheschi, in Richard Pattee's *El catolicismo contemporaneo en Hispano-América,* p. 37.

explode violently. "Latin America," as a Salvadorean explained to me, "was Christian long before the United States ever existed and has nothing to learn from them. We don't need the Yankee missionaries to teach us the doctrine of Christ, while in the United States there are 100,000,000 pagans who never go to church. Let them convert their own country first! Let them preach their contradictory creeds to the heathen of Asia and Africa! Why don't they leave in peace this Christian continent?"

The peace of Christ is certainly the greatest desire of all the Catholics of Latin America, but it is at times a peace they are much afraid of losing.

### EFFECT OF PROTESTANT TACTICS

In the view of many Latin Americans, the approach adopted by the Protestant missionaries is actually, even though unintentionally, opening the way to agnosticism and Marxism. That is why the enlightened and moderate Catholics are convinced that North American Protestantism is making a big mistake in trying to force on the Latin republics the religious chaos of the United States. As Mgr. Francheschi remarked: ". . . the propaganda to which I have referred does not usually make Protestants, but *unmakes Catholics,* for it is infinitely more negative than positive."[3] It is planting, in a continent that has known during four hundred years the benefits of spiritual unity, the seeds of future national quarrels by creating in Catholic nations dissatisfied minorities which become foreign to the religious tradition of their own milieu, if not potential enemies of the civilization in which they live.

From a strictly dogmatic point of view, the enlightened Catholics also ask themselves if Protestantism might not ultimately drive millions of people towards religious indifference or agnosticism; the religious situation in the United States gives cause for some worry about the future of religion in Latin America.

According to this trend of opinion, if Protestantism can make permanent gains in the ignorant and illiterate masses, the Catholics fear that, while conversions in the educated classes might be but temporary, these others may constitute a likely transition towards agnosticism. As they point out, even in the case of the ignorant and

[3] *Ibid.*

illiterate classes, the Catholic faith is associated with their civilization. In order to push such an individual towards abjuration of the Catholic faith, it is necessary first of all to prove to him that this "traditional doctrine" is erroneous; his psychological state must be challenged. However, when you argue against the Church which claims to have been founded by Christ Himself and His Apostles, the danger in the Latin mentality is great that you might resort to explanations that undermine the very basis of Christianity in its entirety. Thus, from the moment he begins to rationalize and doubt in this manner, what may prevent the ex-Catholic from concluding that Protestantism is also incoherent, just another sort of bunk to be thrown away? The neophyte who has just abjured a religion claiming to have been established by Christ 2,000 years ago will still more easily reject a doctrine preached by Luther, Calvin or Joseph Smith not so long ago. History proves that de-catholicization in the Latin countries of Europe has not been profitable to Protestantism as much as it has been to agnosticism and Marxism; the enlightened Catholics of Latin America fear the same result in their countries.

Indeed, if European history should repeat itself in Hispanic America, there would result a probability that the tactics of North American Protestantism may drive millions of de-christianized South Americans towards agnostic or Marxist materialism. In what proportion? That is impossible to predict; but the Catholic Church has already started to counteract. Latin Americans may realize full well that it is not the intention of Protestant missionaries to further the cause of agnosticism, but they see it as an existing and not merely a possible danger. Hence something must be done.

### PRO SALUTE AMERICAE LATINAE

In all the Catholic countries of the world, but especially in nations which like French Canada are nearer to the Latin mind, an international crusade is being organized to save Hispanic America from the spiritual anarchy feared. A plan is under study to send educators, social workers, lay and religious missionaries to the rescue of the Church of Christ. Latin America will thus become the battlefield of the most unneeded struggle of its history.

What, it may be asked, will U. S. Protestantism gain from its anti-Catholic foray into Latin America? From all indications,

nothing much: nothing of any value except an increase of hostility against the United States among the people who should normally be her allies against Communism. How many Latin Catholics will feel inclined to shout: "Down with the religious imperialism of the United States!" at the very moment the Communists have already started to yell: "Down with the economic imperialism of the United States!"

In the final analysis, what conclusion is to be brought forth by the impartial observer, by the historian of ideas in the face of such a disturbing situation? Speaking from the point of view of a French Canadian, might it not be asked if, among many mistakes made by our beloved neighbors in their defense of our civilization, we are not faced with a most ill-inspired and misguided proselytism at a crucial moment when the Western World must avoid all useless causes of disunity and conflict, when all men of good will must rather unite to resist and repulse the growing forces of evil? It is a question that needs serious consideration in these troubled times.

PAUL BOUCHARD

*Laval University*
*Quebec, Canada*

# CATHOLIC PROFESSORS ON THE NON-SECTARIAN COLLEGE CAMPUS

One of the most neglected, yet strategically important areas for the apostolic work of the Church in the United States today is the non-sectarian college and university campus. It is here that some two-thirds of the Catholic students in the country take their degrees, where most of the students of other faiths receive theirs, and where much of the scholarly research in the country is initiated and continued.

Ten per cent is a high estimate of the number of Catholic professors on any one of these campuses. The low percentage, in proportion to the Catholic population, has many explanations. One is undoubtedly a certain indifference on the part of far too many Catholics to the development of the Catholic intellectual. Protesants, on the other hand, have encouraged their membership to qualify for teaching posts in the universities, and in recent years there has been a strong Jewish interest. Anti-Catholic efforts have, at times, conspired to prevent the appointment and promotion of well-qualified Catholics, although not as often as some weak Catholic candidates might claim. A Catholic woman has the additional handicap of sex in what has become a largely man-controlled profession.

Today the small detachment of Catholic professors on the non-sectarian campus stands in greater need of increased numbers, more so than ever before in the history of higher education in this country. Enrollment of students has doubled and tripled. Moreover, many young people today are sincerely searching for the truth in the very disturbed world in which we find ourselves.

By his presence on the campus, the Catholic professor can become for many of these searchers a most profound influence for good the rest of their lives. His scholarly pursuit of the truth is a living proof against anti-Catholic propaganda to the contrary. His dedication to the duties of his teaching vocation and his personal interest in the talents and welfare of students and colleagues, beyond the call of duty, are the telling action of his Catholicism. He receives by way of response to his generosity, lasting and

understanding friendship and co-operation in the worthwhile campus efforts for the common good.

For the Catholic student, the Catholic teacher is an ever present source of encouragement to maintain and grow in adult knowledge and practice of the Faith. The student sees the reason for the studious development of his own God-given talents, and may, upon occasion, even seek out the advice and assistance of those teachers whom he has come to know and respect on the campus; this is all a part of the lay apostolate in our modern world.

### AN EXAMPLE

The case of M. may serve by way of illustration to indicate the important role that can be played by the Catholic teacher in such a situation. M. came to college when sixteen years old; she was in the freshman class of a non-Catholic colleague. This woman had often asked questions about the Church and came to morning Mass with me on occassional holidays in the country.

The students in my friend's class were discussing their "problems," and M. said that she also had one: She did not know whether she should "take Communion." Non-plussed, the teacher suggested that she talk it over with her Catholic friend on the staff. We talked it over soon afterwards and continued to discuss the problem until M. was ready for her First Holy Communion. Instruction for Confirmation followed, but then she suddenly left college, with no trace of her at the home address.

It was not until some time later, at Christmas time, that I received a card with her address. She had been living with her father, but had decided to go to work and to stay with friends. Her mother was in an asylum to which she had been committed when M. was a small child; her brother was away at war. I urged her to get back to college, which was safer than industry. She could live on her brother's army allotment, and he would be proud of a B.A. sister when he returned.

As a result, M. re-entered college. Before long she was ready for the long postponed Confirmation. Not long after, the assistance given her by the non-Catholic colleague was repaid; she was now in M's prayers frequently. Eventually, this teacher also entered

the Church, is a daily communicant, and continues to be widely read in the literature of the Church.

With her new appreciation of the faith, M. became more and more apostolic. She had met a boy in one of her classes who played ball on Sundays instead of going to Mass, and they were attracted to one another; but dating with her soon became contingent on his attendance at Sunday Mass. He also soon became a far more apostolic Catholic.

The chaplain of the Newman Club eventually came to refer to M. as the "club theologian," because of her interest and knowledge of the Church's teaching. In the three years after her return to college, the Newman Club membership tripled, largely through her efforts and those of the boy who dated her. After graduation she became a teacher in a foreign section of the city and a few years later was married to the boy from her college class, now a lawyer; they remain to this day a truly apostolic couple.

### INFLUENCE OF THE CATHOLIC TEACHER

By his example and co-operation in this and similar ways, the Catholic teacher on a non-sectarian campus is a support to the Catholic chaplain in his work of carrying out the directives of our recent Popes in regard to the apostolate. Upon occasion, a well-informed teacher may assist in giving catechetical instruction, and may also take part in discussion groups concerned with the problems of meeting the complicated life in our present-day world. He may also give instruction in the use of the Missal and in participation in the Dialogue Mass; he may serve as a commentator in such a Dialogue Mass. He lends worthwhile books to the students, and encourages the adult Catholic reading which must accompany the student's pursuit of higher secular learning. The teacher is also at times called upon for help in making a priestly contact for those in need of spiritual and moral guidance. This is all a part of his or her apostolic work in the environment of a modern university.

There are constantly unexpected calls for information about the faith; the Catholic teacher is, in a way, a "marked man." The ready Catholic, well-informed, may contribute in this way to the general good of the Church. These opportunities for answering

the honest inquiries of non-Catholic colleagues and students often occur in casual conversation. Finally, the Catholic professor is in a unique position for providing for the all too often neglected post-conversion needs of the intellectual catechumen.

The apostolate of the working-man continues to be of paramount importance throughout the world today. In the United States, the apostolate of the *children* of the working-man, however, is very often carried on in the non-sectarian colleges and universities of the country; this also is an essential part of that program envisioned in the total apostolic task of the Church in the modern world. It is in large measure through Catholic teachers in these colleges and universities who are highly respected in their chosen fields of specialization that these students will see the reflected image of Christ the Teacher as He lives on in the intellectual life of His members.

HELEN ROACH

*Brooklyn College*
*Brooklyn, N. Y.*

# MODERN MAN AND GOD

Modern man in Western civilization has often been called a "godless man," and perhaps in the overall view, this may not be an unjust description. If it were possible to balance off the number of those who believe in God against those who reject Him, the scale might tell a sad story. And yet this does not mean that modern man is not *concerned* with God. Quite the contrary: for centuries the history of Western thought has shown man denying God, running away from Him, fighting Him, even hating Him. But the modern world has by no means been ignoring God.

As we watch the progress of atheistic Communism spread its influence throughout the entire world, we begin to appreciate even more the dimensions of this problem. We are forced by this very situation to take an active part in the battle against the promoters of ungodliness. In a very real sense this constant searching for God which underlies so much of our current civilization is a reflection of this struggle. Men continue to seek God even while He is rejected more universally by others. This is reflected in our present-day literature, in our art and poetry, in our philosophies. Our stage plays, the movies, television programs all reflect this theme that is approaching ever closer to the man in the street, wandering far from God and becoming more bewildered with each step.

How is modern man to find God once again? This is the basic problem. Two roads open up before him: the way of reason and the way of faith. It may have been an unfortunate failing of the last centuries that men have attempted to defend God and religion more on the basis of reason than of faith. It is an understandable reaction, since those who have denied the existence of God most vehemently have done so in the name of reason. The defenders of faith have attempted to meet them on their own grounds, however; and in so doing, they may have neglected far too much the approach of faith in striving to defend the way of reason.

It has been above all in the post-Kantian era—the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—that philosophical atheism came into prominence. Kant had hoped in his own way to defend a belief in God, but his attempts to cast out forever the proofs for the ex-

istence of God by reason opened up paths which led later philosophers in two opposite directions. There were those who, like Schleiermacher, searched the subjective side of man's life, seeking to find there, within man himself, the traces of God, of religion and of revelation. They followed the path of a purely subjective faith and quite unwittingly perhaps led to the ultimate of subjective belief in the pantheism (or theopanism) of Hegel, for whom Reason became God, and God, as Absolute Reason, unfolded Himself in the history of mankind.

Others, however, chose the other road—the road of atheism or despair. Feuerbach and Nietzsche set the pattern for this; Marx and Engels, separating their thought from that of Hegel on this point, furthered the growth of militant atheism and incorporated it into the political system they devised.

There is perhaps no more somber phrase with which to describe the end result of both of these tendencies than "the speculative Good Friday." Christianity had preached for centuries that God died on the cross, for Christ of Nazareth was true God. But these modern philosophers understood the phrase in a far more universal sense. To the modern atheist, the phrase "God is dead" means that the very notion of God has been destroyed; it has been cast out forever from the mind of man.

### THE SPIRIT OF OPTIMISM

It was in the writings of Nietzsche that this thought came to expression in its most literary and also its most shocking form. In 1886 Nietzsche wrote his famous description of the madman who came to proclaim the new truth, a truth which was in reality the gospel of Nietzsche himself:

On a brightly shining morning, the madman lights a lantern and sets out for the marketplace crying, "I am looking for God! I am looking for God!" Those who hear him, many of whom do not believe in God at all, laugh heartily: "Is He lost?" says one. "Has He lost His way like a child?" asks another. "Or is he hiding!" The madman springs into the midst of them and gazes upon them with piercing eyes:

Where is God? I will tell you! We have killed Him—you and I! We are all His murderers! But how did we come to do this? How

did we manage to drain out the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe out the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Where does it move now? Where are we moving? Far away from all suns? Are we not tossed about incessantly? And backwards, sidewards, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above, a below? Are we not wandering as if through an endless nothingness? Is not the void breathing upon us? Has it not become colder? Does the night and more night not come on endlessly? Must not the lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we yet hear nothing of the noise of the grave-diggers who bury God? Do we yet perceive nothing of the odor of the divine decaying?—Gods also decay! God is dead. God remains dead! And we have killed Him![1]

His hearers understood him not, and the madman went away, giving them time to think over his words and realize what they had done: "And it is told still that on that same day the madman broke into different churches and there began to intone his *Requiem aeternam deo.* Led out and made to give an account, only this did he continually reply: 'What then are these churches now if not the tombs and monuments of God?' "[2]

We have here an astounding description of the godless man of the modern world: the man who has cast God aside and who must now make his way through the void, searching for a substitute for God, for someone or something that will give meaning to his life once more, that will be a new foundation upon which man may build and from which he may derive a sense of cosmic security.

The solutions offered to this problem have varied through the decades. For Nietzsche the solution was simple: man himself was to become a god:

Now this God is dead! You higher men, this God was your greatest danger. It is only since he lay in the grave that you have risen again. Only now the great noontide comes; only now the higher man becomes lord! Do you understand this saying, O my brothers? You are frightened: do your hearts fail you? Does the abyss yawn at your feet? Does the hound of hell bay you? What of it? Forward! Higher men! Now

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[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (Leipzig: E. W. Fritzsch, 1887), No. 125. p. 153.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.

at last the mountain of man's future is about to give birth. God is dead; now it is our will that the Superman shall live.[3]

The Supermen will replace God; they will be the foundation of human life. Nietzsche would not stand by in helpless despair, nor tremble in the void. He would set mankind to work in order that out of its nothingness there might be created something that will surpass it and rise above it. Moving ever forward, the Superman will triumph. This was, of course, the philosophy from which the ill-fated Nazism of Adolph Hitler sprang, and it is little wonder that the humbling defeat of this attempt brought with it the final collapse of Nietzschean optimism.

A similar type of optimism was expressed in the philosophy of Karl Marx. It is not, however, the Superman that replaces God in the aspirations of the Marxist man; it is the social community. Man lives not for himself nor for God; he lives solely for the ceaseless progress of mankind. As Pius XI emphasized: "In such a doctrine, as is evident, there is no room for the idea of God: there is no difference between matter and spirit, between soul and body; there is neither survival of the soul after death nor any hope in a future life."[4] The individual will live on after death only in that society of the future which he labored to create; it is for this that he lives.

The social atheism of Marx includes the famous axiom that "religion is the opium of the people," and Marxism insists that only when men have finally rid themselves entirely of the notion of God will they engage themselves properly in the pursuit of the economic and social progress envisioned. God and religion must first be cast aside, however. They are obstacles to this progressive movement, hence it is a necessary prerequisite: "The abolition of religion," Marx once wrote, "as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their real happiness."[5] Only in this way will men

[3] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, Part IV, No. 73, 2.

[4] Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris: On Atheistic Communism* (New York: Paulist Press Edition, 1937), par. 9.

[5] Karl Marx, "Toward the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right," in *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, edited by T. Bottomore and M. Rubel (London: Watts, 1956), p. 27.

struggle for and finally achieve the Utopia of a truly classless society preached by the disciples of Marx.[6]

### THE SPIRIT OF PESSIMISM

At the opposite extreme of these various sorts of philosophical optimism there is the despair and pessimism of the atheistic existentialist. Possibly Jean-Paul Sartre, the philosopher best known in this connection, gives the most precise statement of its views. For Sartre, man can be understood most basically as a desire to be God; this is the meaning of man. Not unlike Nietzsche, Sartre would hold this out as the answer to man's most fundamental desires, but contrary to Nietzsche, he paints it as an unattainable goal. Man desires to be God, but he cannot; hence he is doomed to endless frustration. His entire life is futility and frustration. He is born to suffer in vain, and death is simply the ultimate and unending frustration of a useless existence:

> Every human presence in the world is a passion, in that it is a project to lose itself in order to found being and in the same act constitute the *En-soi* which escapes contingency in being its own ground, the *Ens causa sui* which the religions call God. Thus man's passion is the inverse of Christ's, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain; man is a useless passion.[7]

After the horrors of the Second World War, following fast enough on the footsteps of the First World War, there were many in Europe who turned to this type of thought. The optimism of the late nineteenth century was gone; things were *not* becoming better and better each day in every way. There were many, therefore, who had rejected God but who could no longer dream seriously of a man-made-God and who were too bruised by the wounds of war to care much about the rise of a future Utopian society; thus they gave expression to their innermost feelings, and turned to a darkened philosophy of despair.

### OPPOSITE REACTIONS

This does not exhaust the general tendencies followed by various

[6] In still another fashion, this optimistic hope for the unending progress of mankind found expression in the Positivism of Auguste Comte, in which "humanity" replaces "God." Cf. de Lubac, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-159.

[7] Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, 4th ed. (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1953), p. 708.

thinkers in the post-Kantian era. There was an important group, symbolized chiefly by Søren Kierkegaard, who, no less than Kant, rejected human reason as a means of coming to know God, but who also refused either to deify reason along with Hegel, or embrace despair with more recent trends of thought. They turned accordingly to "faith" as a means by which man could encounter God.

Kierkegaard lived out his life as the sworn opponent of Hegelian rationalism. He struggled with one of the most basic problems of human life: the relationship between faith and reason. His solution, however, failed to do full justice either to faith or to reason. For Kierkegaard, the entrance into the way of faith was a totally irrational act. It was a blind leap into the absurd. Once man had acquired the courage to make such a leap, Kierkegaard insisted that the shadows were lifted, but he refused to admit any preparation whatsoever on the part of man or human reason for this act by which man plunged himself into faith. He failed, briefly, to grasp the relationship between faith itself and the motives of credibility, by which the reasonableness of faith is established.[8] Kierkegaard was willing to admit no more than Kant himself in regard to the ability of the human reason to know the existence of God, but he also denied any possibility of a rational preparation for faith. In his system, faith came abruptly, violently, and it is presented as the only solution for man's dilemma; nothing else could save mankind from either the anti-Christian position of Nietzsche or the despairing pessimism of Sartre in the next century.

Among Catholic theologians there were also those who became engaged in the same debate; not all of their teachings were approved by the Church. There were, above all, those who accepted the Kantian position that God could not be known by the use of human reason alone. At the same time, these Catholic writers felt that prior to faith, there must be some manner in which man might come to the knowledge of God's existence as a preparation for faith. From this general line of thought there arose the condemnations of Traditionalism which occupy so great a part of the history of Catholic doctrine in the nineteenth century. Each in his own way, Bautain, de Lamennais, Bonald and Bonnetty set forth the

[8] Cf. Regis Jolivet, *Introduction to Kierkegaard,* translated by W. H. Barber (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1950), pp. 50-65.

basic principle that man cannot know the existence of God by reason alone, and proceeded then to root his first approach to God in some form of either natural or supernatural "tradition," handed down from generation to generation in the human community.[9]

These various systems spoke of some sort of primitive revelation, reflected in the universal agreement of mankind; this was to be the explanation of man's acceptance of the existence of God. This "revelation" was not necessarily the Mosaic or Christian revelation; it was something more fundamental and more primitive, something preserved within human society itself. It was, moreover, only after the influence of this "tradition" or "primitive revelation" had been felt that human reason was able, of itself, to know the existence of God; without such a tradition, the Kantian position remained true.

### FAITH AND REASON

It was with this post-Kantian problem above all that the I Vatican Council was concerned in the Second Chapter of its Constitution, *Dei Filius,* on Catholic Faith.[10] Against the Kantian position, the Church asserted that "God, the origin and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from the things that He created."[11] At the same time, the Council dealt with the problem raised by the Traditionalists and Fideists concerning the necessity of revelation for man's knowledge of the existence of God.[12]

These statements of I Vatican Council touch on a number of important points and are couched in very precise terms. Perhaps this complexity has contributed somewhat to a misunderstanding of what the Church actually decreed at this Council. As a defender of the power of human reason to know God's existence, the Catholic Church has often been accused of overstating the work of reason and understating the role of faith. There are even some Catholic authors who tend to give the impression that the I Vatican Council

[9] Denz. 1613 ff.; 1622 ff.; 1649 ff.
[10] Denz. 1785 ff.; 1806 ff.
[11] Denz. 1785.
[12] Denz. 1786.

solemnly defined that every single human being is capable of knowing the existence of God alone, and that such a knowledge of God by reason is a necessary prerequisite to divine faith.

In his tract *De Deo uno et trino,* for example, Cardinal Billot tends to give this general impression, stating that "a certain knowledge of God can be had through the light of reason not only by the learned but also by the mass of mankind."[13] Unlike I Vatican Council, however, Billot limits the word "knowledge" to what he calls an "elementary knowledge" *(cognitio elementaris),* rather than the more complete knowledge excluding all doubt and error, spoken of by the Council.[14] Billot also adds a further condition, namely, that the ordinary individual receive the help of teachers who will unfold this truth of reason to him, since he is really incapable of discovering the knowledge of God's existence by his independent thought alone.

Even granting these various limitations, this is not an entirely satisfactory solution, since Billot asserts that what he holds is true only with a condition that is not always verified in fact, that is, that the "regular conditions of education" are preserved intact. Where this is not verified—as one might suspect would often be the case—his attitude in regard to the general knowledge of God by reason is considerably less optimistic.[15]

More important, however, it is Billot's contention that man must know the existence of God by reason *prior* to the act of faith; otherwise, he contends, faith will cease to be a "reasonable" act. As he points out, faith presupposes a judgment of credibility by which one judges that it is both necessary and obligatory to assent voluntarily to the truth of revelation on the authority of the One revealing. Chief among the truths included in the formation of such a judgment of credibility, however, Billot places the certain knowledge of the existence of God; this must be acquired by reason alone. The knowledge of God's existence cannot be included among those truths which are accepted on divine faith since, according to Billot, this would require—before the act of faith in

[13] Ludovicus Billot, S.J., *De Deo uno et trino,* ed. 7a (Romae: Universitas Gregoriana, 1935), Quaestio II, p. 23.

[14] Denz. 1786.

[15] Billot, *op. cit.,* pp. 23-24.

Christian revelation—a prior act of faith in God's existence, which would in turn have also required a prior judgment of credibility, thus setting up an infinite series of such related acts.[16]

Billot's position on this question is intimately linked to his well-known teaching on the act of faith itself, which affirms the possibility of a "scientific faith" or "natural faith," whose psychological motive would differ in no way from that of supernatural faith.[17] Such a natural faith would require a natural knowledge of the existence of God, since it is precisely "natural knowledge" and not "faith." The supernatural grace of faith would simply elevate this psychologically natural act to the supernatural level according to this theory; it would affect the act of faith only entitatively and not psychologically.

There are many theologians today, however, who teach that the effect of the grace of faith is also and above all psychological, holding with Trütsch that this position alone "does justice to the realism of grace."[18] In this approach, one is not faced with the same problem as that which concerned Billot. In the act of faith itself, psychologically different from all other acts because of the grace of faith, man is able to perceive not only the truths revealed by God but also the authority of God Himself revealing these truths. Thus there is no difficulty in explaining how God reveals the fact of His existence. There is no infinite series involved, since belief in the existence of God demands no prior judgment of credibility; the judgment of superhuman activity associated with the motives of credibility will also be the ground by which the reasonableness of one's belief in God's existence is established.

In general, it would appear that this second view would be more in accord with the teaching of I Vatican Council, and also

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

[17] Ludovicus Billot, S.J., *De virtutibus infusis*, ed. 4a (Romae: Universitas Gregoriana, 1928), pp. 182-203; 292; 313-321. Cf. also Josephus A. De Aldama, S.J., *De virtutibus infusis*, in *Sacrae theologiae summa* (Madrid: B.A.C., 1953), III, 775-778 (no. 116).

[18] Josef Trütsch, "Glaube," in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 2nd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1960), IV, 922. Cf. also R. Aubert, *Le problème de l'acte de foi* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1945); Henricus Vignon, S.J., *De virtutibus et donis vitae supernaturalis* (Romae: Universitas Gregoriana, 1948-1953); Joannes B. Alfaro, S.J., *Adnotationes in tractatum de virtutibus* (Romae: Universitas Gregoriana, 1956).

with the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas which the Council adopted as its own in a large measure when dealing with this topic.

### THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS

In the *Summa Theologiae* (I, q. 1, art. 1), St. Thomas points out why it is necessary to have another doctrine besides philosophy. This doctrine of which he is speaking is, of course, the teaching of revelation; this is another divinely inspired knowledge given to men by God and accepted in the act of faith.

St. Thomas insists that this added knowledge is necessary first of all in regard to *supernatural* truths which surpass entirely the natural power of human reason. Without revelation, mankind could in no way come to know them. Since God has *de facto* destined man for a supernatural goal, such a revelation is entirely necessary so that man might know that fact and the truths associated with it.

On the other hand, St. Thomas also insists that revelation is necessary in regard to those truths which, in themselves, do not surpass the powers of unaided reason if they are to be known by all men. He notes that such a knowledge of God when gained through the use of reason alone is acquired only "by few, and after a long time, and with a mixture of many errors. . . ."[19] Yet the salvation of man depends upon a knowledge of these truths, so that a revelation that includes them is also necessary; otherwise the salvation of man could not proceed properly and in due time.

In his answer to the second objection, St. Thomas also emphasizes that there is a generic difference between natural theology and the knowledge of faith with which theology deals. This, of course, touches upon a question treated in greater detail later on, that is, the possibility of believing something which could, of itself, be known by reason alone. In the *Summa* (II-II, q. 2, art. 4), St. Thomas asks "Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proven by natural reason?" His answer is that it *is* necessary to believe such matters, and he gives as a chief example the fact that "it is necessary to believe that God is one and incorporeal, which are proven through natural reason by philosophers."[20]

[19] *I*, q. 1, art. 1, c.
[20] *II-II*, q. 2, art. 4, sed contra.

St. Thomas' entire discussion of this matter is existential in outlook; he is concerned with man as he exists in the present historic order, a child of Adam in need of God's redeeming grace. The objections he proposes argue that (1) revelation of these natural truths would be superfluous, and God does not do what is superfluous; (2) that knowledge *(scientia)* and faith *(fides)* are not concerned with the same things, so that what can be proven through reason cannot be held on faith at all; and (3) that if certain truths knowable by reason were proposed to be held on faith, all natural truths would have to be included in this revelation because they all pertain to the same category.[21]

The *answer* given by St. Thomas is that there are three reasons why man must accept on faith not only truths which are above reason but even those which can be known by reason alone:

(1) That man might come to the knowledge of God *more quickly*. The knowledge of God by reason alone presupposes a great deal of information on other points of learning, so that the approach to God through reason alone requires a great length of time; these other fields of information must be conquered first. Thus faith removes the need for so long a delay in coming to know the existence of God and similar natural truths.

(2) That the knowledge of God might be *more common* among men. There are many, St. Thomas insists, who cannot make great progress in learning. Native talents are not always equal to this; others, having the talent, are either so occupied with necessary work in the temporal order that they cannot undertake the necessary study, while others simply lack the ambition to face up to this arduous task. Because of this all of these people would be kept from the knowledge of God's existence, unless it were revealed to them and could be accepted on faith.

(3) That the knowledge of God's existence might be *more certain*. Human reason is deficient in many things. An indication of this is that even the philosophers who have carefully scrutinized human life by the means of reason alone have fallen into error on many points, and they openly contradict one another. Thus, in order that man's knowledge of God's existence might exclude any doubt and be rendered absolutely certain, it is necessary that

[21] *Ibid* (objectiones).

this and related facts of the natural order be revealed by God and accepted on supernatural faith.[22]

In answering the three objections posed at the beginning of the article, the position of St. Thomas is clarified even more. The first objection contended that God does not do what is superfluous and that therefore He would not reveal the fact of His existence, since this can be known by human reason. In answer, St. Thomas states simply that, while human reason can know certain things about God, it does not suffice ***even in these matters*** to give men the complete knowledge they need; hence revelation of these natural truths is not superfluous.

The second objection held that a man cannot *believe* what he can prove by ***reason***. St. Thomas admits that this is true, but referring back to a previous article (II-II, q. 1, art. 5), which was mentioned in the objection itself, he repeats what was taught there, namely, that what can be known by one individual through the use of reason alone can nevertheless be accepted by another on faith.[23] The position of St. Thomas in this earlier article is simply that *if* a man has *de facto* acquired knowledge of God's existence through the use of reason, that individual cannot at the same time believe what he already knows of God's existence. For those, however, who have not or cannot acquire such demonstrative proof, it is both possible and necessary that they accept the existence of God and other natural truths on the authority of God revealing. Man must accept these truths on faith at least, since they are the foundation of other things accepted on faith and which pertain solely to the supernatural order.[24]

[22] *Ibid* (corpus).

[23] *II-II*, q. 1, art. 5, c.: "Potest tamen contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno, sit creditum ab alio . . . ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno homine, etiam in statu viae, sit ab alio creditum, qui hoc demonstrative non novit."

[24] *II-II*, q. 1, art. 5, ad 3: "Praeterea, ea quae demonstrative probantur sunt scita: quia demonstratio est *syllogismus faciens scire*. Sed quaedam quae in fide continentur sunt demonstrative probata a philosophis: sicut Deum esse, et Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita.—*Ad tertium* dicendum quod ea quae demonstrative probari possunt inter credenda numerantur, non quia de ipsis sit simpliciter fides apud omnes: sed quia praeexiguntur ad ea quae sunt fidei, et oportet ea saltem per fidem praesupponi ab his qui horum demonstrationem non habent."

Finally, St. Thomas answers the third objection that, since they belong to the same category, if one or two truths knowable by reason alone were included in supernatural revelation, *all* the truths of the natural order would have to be thus revealed. St. Thomas simply states that this conclusion does not follow at all, since the reason for revealing certain truths and not revealing others is their intimate and essential relationship to eternal salvation. In this regard, there are many other truths of the natural order which are not so related to man's eternal happiness, and hence not all truths of the natural order are proposed in like manner as objects of faith.[25]

### I VATICAN COUNCIL

It was this same teaching that was formulated by I Vatican Council in its solemn definition regarding the power of reason to know the existence of God. The mind of the Council appears first of all in the Schema and the Annotations distributed together with it to the bishops in attendance at the Council; these formulas had been worked out by the preparatory commission before the Council was celebrated.

Chapter Two of this Schema concerned the condemnation of Rationalism first of all, and began with the words: "It must not be doubted that the true God can be known by the natural light of human reason itself through those things which are made. . . ."[26] This phrase differs little from the final form adopted by the Council.[27] The original Schema is presented with a special annotation (no. 6) which helped direct further discussion. It notes that this entire chapter was directed against the errors of nineteenth century Rationalism and its denial of supernatural revelation. This particular statement concerning the power of human reason was added more or less as a foreword to the defense of supernatural revelation; it was also directed against the teaching of those who denied this power of human reason. The authors of the Schema point out, however, that the opening words declaring that human

[25] *II-II*, q. 2, art. 4, ad 3.

[26] *Collectio Lacensis: Acta et decreta sacrorum conciliorum recentiorum* (Friburgi: Herder, 1890), VII, 507, d (Caput II: Condemnatio rationalismi). —This work is cited hereafter as *C.L.*

[27] Denz. 1785 (*C.L.*, VII, 250, d).

reason alone can know the existence of God must be understood in the light of three points which would aid in understanding what they suggested to the bishops as important elements in any possible definition:[28]

(1) They are speaking, obviously, only of those who had achieved the actual use of reason.

(2) Moreover, what they are suggesting is "not a question of the *fact* whether individual men derive their first knowledge of God from this natural manifestation, and are not moved, rather, to seek God through a revelation proposed to them, and learn that God exists from this revealed doctrine itself proposed to them. . . ."[29] It was the intention that this Chapter deal solely with the *native power* of human reason in itself, stating that the objective manifestation of God's existence through created beings is proportioned to these innate powers and that thus man, by using these powers alone, *is able* to know God's existence apart from faith. Hence, if other means of acquiring the knowledge of God's existence are not at hand, there nevertheless remains the obligation of man coming to know God's existence by the use of his unaided powers.[30]

(3) Finally, the members of the preparatory commission indicated that their suggested decree was not intended to deal with the conditions necessary for a child coming to the use of reason (life, for example, within a social group, and similar questions which had been discussed by theologians of the nineteenth century). What was to be condemned was the teaching of those Traditionalists (referred to here and later as *Traditionalismus Crudior*)[31] who

[28] *C.L.*, VII, 520, c-d.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Ibid.*—It might be noted that while I Vatican Council is concerned always with a complete knowledge of God, with no admixture of error, this is not necessarily the type of knowledge spoken of when theologians discuss the salvation of the pagan who has absolutely no contact with divine revelation. Yet even an obscure knowledge of God does not solve the entire problem since this also may be difficult for some to obtain. Moreover, the pagan must also establish contact with supernatural faith, the root and foundation of all justification; mere rational knowledge of God, even obscure knowledge, is not the entire solution. This is assuredly one of the most difficult problems facing theologians today, but it is not an acceptable solution to claim, as some tend to do, that a clear knowledge of God by reason is a comparatively easy task.

[31] *C.L.*, VII, 129, d.

assert that the revelation of the existence of God is a necessary prerequisite to the proper development of human reason, and who taught accordingly that human reason could not come to the knowledge of God's existence through created beings unless this fact was *first* known through revelation. Then only, they contended, could human reason confirm and recognize this fact through a consideration of created things. The decree of I Vatican Council thus would be aimed against those who made revelation a prerequisite for rational knowledge. Thus it was suggested that the chapter might even add the phrase that the existence of God can be known by the light of human reason "even before *(citra)* the positive doctrine handed down by God."[32]

This suggested Schema and these Annotations became the basis of further discussion at I Vatican Council. The Schema originally proposed by the preparatory commission was changed in many ways, but merely to improve the form; the content remained essentially the same. The revised formula of the Schema is, with minor changes, the one used to state the doctrine of the Church regarding the natural knowledge of God (the first paragraph of Chapter Two with the corresponding canon).[33]

In the explanation concerning this first revised Schema, given by Archbishop Simor, it was emphasized that this section of the decree was aimed against both the Traditionalists and the phenomenological philosophy of Kant and his disciples who taught that human reason does not truly know things but only perceives

[32] *C.L.*, VII, 521, b. There still remains room for further investigation as to whether the various Traditionalists or Fideists in their teaching envisioned a natural tradition (or faith) or a supernatural revelation, even Christian revelation.

[33] Denz. 1785: Eadem sancta mater Ecclesia tenet et docet, Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis certo cognosci posse; *"invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur"* [*Rom.* 1:20]: attamen placuisse eius sapientiae et bonitati, alia eaque supernaturali via se ipsum ac aeterna voluntatis suae decreta humano generi revelare, dicente Apostolo: *"Multifariam multisque modis olim Deus loquens patribus in Prophetis: novissime diebus istis locutus est nobis in Filio"* [*Heb.* 1:1 sq.]— Denz. 1806: "1. Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse: anathema sit." (Cf. also *C.L.*, VII, 72, a; 76, b.)

them.[34] Archbishop Simor, however, does not bother to repeat a detailed explanation of the manner in which this part of the Chapter and the corresponding canon are to be understood, since "these matters are clearly set forth in the annotations."[35]

After this first revision, there were a number of *emendationes* in regard to these passages, submitted to the *Deputatio fidei* by the bishops participating in the Council. Bishop Gasser, speaking for the *Deputatio fidei,* gave the reasons why these suggestions were either accepted or set aside. In his introductory remarks, he again emphasized the fact that the decree was concerned with the "active power" within man for knowing the existence of God.[36] When discussing the corresponding canon, the same thing is stated: the teaching is directed against those who deny that man has such a natural power of knowing God.[37]

Bishop Gasser also spoke of a number of *emendationes* that touched on this particular point. One of them (no. 49) proposed that the words "ab homine" be set aside, "lest we appear to define as a dogma of the faith that there could never be any adult human beings who are invincibly ignorant of God." The suggestion was also made that the word "human" further modify the word "reason" in the canon.[38] This *emendatio* was accepted by the *Deputatio fidei* for the reasons given,[39] and later, officially, by the bishops participating in this session of the Council.[40] Thus the mind of the Council is clearly reflected in this particular change; it was not speaking of individual men and their personal ability to know the existence of God and other related truths of the natural order.

This twice revised formula was finally voted on by the bishops on April 12, 1870.[41] Following this, however, there were further *emendationes* attached by various bishops to their vote on April

[34] *C.L.,* VII, 86, c: "Capitis principium dirigitur contra traditionalistas, sed etiam dirigitur contra illum errorem, qui late in Germania propagatus est, eorum nempe qui dicunt rationem per se nihil cognoscere sed tantum percipere."

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *C.L.,* VII, 127, d.

[37] *C.L.,* VII, 148, b.

[38] *C.L.,* VII, 125, c.

[39] *C.L.,* VII, 149, b.

[40] *C.L.,* VII, 153, c.

[41] *C.L.,* VII, 215, a. (Congregatio 45: *C.L.,* VII, 739, a).

12; hence Bishop Gasser, speaking for the *Deputatio fidei* in the general congregation of April 19, discussed these particular points.[42] There were three suggested changes which add further light to the question of the natural knowledge of the existence of God and similar truths of the natural order. One of them (no. 51) objected chiefly to the use of the word *"certo"* and argued that not even the greatest of the philosophers, left to reason alone—neither Aristotle, nor Plato nor Cicero—"who exemplified almost all the power of reason, so much so that present-day philosophers might follow their footsteps, were able to know God with certitude as the beginning and end of all things. If none of the philosophers, therefore, were able to know this without a mixture of many errors, as is evident from their speculative theology, we should each see at once not the moral but the necessary truth of the impotency of human reason in coming to know God with certitude as the beginning and end of all things. . . ."[43]

Two other suggested changes (no. 52½ and 53) treated of the same problem—the term *"certo"*—hence they were treated simultaneously by Bishop Gasser.[44] He notes first of all that these bishops continue to be troubled by the word "certitude" despite the fact that it had already been explained that "in this chapter it is a question solely of man in general, no matter what the case may be with individuals . . . ," and that the decree speaks not only of a passive but of "an active power" which human nature possesses and by which man is able to know God's existence. In the light of this, they have still argued that, if this native power of man is not *de facto* activated in individuals, it ought not be called a power but rather "impotence, and indeed not only moral [impotence] but physical."[45] As evidence of this they set forth the inadequate learning of Aristotle and other great philosophers in regard to God.

Bishop Gasser passes over the question of whether a power that is not *de facto* activated is not truly a power, although he suggests further distinctions must be made; but it is not essential to his purpose to discuss this matter. In regard to the various philosophers, however, he insists that such men as Aristotle and Plato

[42] *C.L.*, VII, 232 ff. (Congregatio 46: *C.L.*, VII, 739, d).
[43] *C.L.*, VII, 224, d.
[44] *C.L.*, VII, 225, a; 236, b.
[45] *C.L.*, VII, 236, c.

progressed further in the natural knowledge of God than these *emendationes* would imply. Hence he concludes that this objection need not upset these bishops, as though the Church were defining the existence of a power that had actually never been used by any individual men; there is evidence enough that the great philosophers did really activate this natural power, despite their shortcomings.[46]

Despite this question of history, however, the decree is limited to a discussion of the power itself; it is not concerned with individuals. Thus Bishop Gasser considers another suggestion (no. 52) that the word "natural" (in the phrase "natural light of human reason") be removed, since man has never actually been placed in a state of pure nature. According to Bishop Gasser, the author of the *emendatio* has confused two things: "the principles of reason and the exercise of reason. We are speaking only of the principles of reason, that God can be known with certainty from the principles of reason; whatever may be the case concerning the exercise of reason."[47] In an earlier session, Bishop Gasser had pointed out in discussing a similar *emendatio*[48] that throughout the discussions, the Council has been concerned with the natural power of human reason alone, which would be the same whether in the state of pure nature or in the state of fallen nature.[49]

### THE INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL MEN

On the other hand, I Vatican Council also concerned itself with existential man and the individual in its discussion of the necessity of revelation. This section of the decree was also treated in a number of sessions, and the first reference to this side of the problem appears in the suggested Schema and Annotations drawn up by the preparatory commission.

Chapter Four speaks first of all of God's revelation of supernatural truths, that is, of mysteries in the strict sense, which can in no way be known by reason alone. In this regard, revelation is *absolutely* necessary; apart from the way of faith, there is no manner in which man might come to know these truths. It then goes on

[46] *C.L.*, VII, 236, d; 238, a.
[47] *C.L.*, VII, 238, b.
[48] *C.L.*, VII, 121, a (no. 5).
[49] *C.L.*, VII, 131, c.

to note that the supernatural revelation of God must be acknowledged as the greatest help given mankind even in regard to knowing these natural truths which, in themselves, could be known by reason alone. In fact, considering the present historic state of mankind, that of fallen nature, such a revelation, accommodated to the minds of all men, is a great favor from God so that these natural truths might be known by all "in the proper time, with sufficient amplitude, firm certitude and with no admixture of error. . . ."[50]

The Annotation to this passage notes that *de facto* the revelation given to mankind by God contains within itself truths of two different types: supernatural truths (mysteries in the strict sense), and natural truths (truths which pertain to God and the natural law, and which could, absolutely speaking, be known by the power of reason alone). Hence, one cannot affirm an *absolute* necessity for a revelation of these natural truths, since they could be known by reason. Considering men as they actually exist, however, the "physical power is generally not activated without a special help," at least to the extent that men as individuals come to know these natural truths soon enough, with a certitude excluding all hesitancy, and without the admixture of other errors alongside of the truth perceived. The difficulties involved in this type of knowledge are simply too great for this to occur in the lives of most men.[51] Hence, while the Council ought to affirm, against the Traditionalists and the Kantianists, that human reason of itself can know certain

[50] *C.L.*, VII, 509, b: "Verumtamen in iis etiam, quae de Deo et de lege naturali humanae rationi per se impervia non sunt, agnoscendum est supernaturalis revelationis maximum beneficium; siquidem pro praesenti humani generis conditione, huic supernaturali revelationi debetur harum quoque veritatum propositio omnibus accommodata ita, ut ad earundem cognitionem debito tempore, sufficienti amplitudine, firma certitudine et absque errorum admixtione perveniri possit."

[51] *C.L.*, VII, 524, d: "Attamen pro genere humano in praesenti conditione ad has veritates debito tempore, sufficienti claritate et plena certitudine, sine admixtione errorum assequendas eae sunt difficultates, ut potentia physica generatim non perducatur ad actum sine speciali adiutorio. Difficultates ita comparatae constituunt *impotentiam moralem,* cui respondet *moralis necessitas* adiutorii. Hoc autem adiutorium speciale in communi providentia praesentis ordinis naturae elevatae consistit in ipsa supernaturali revelatione. Ergo haec revelatio quoad illas quoque veritates per se rationales in praesenti ordine censeri debet humano generi *moraliter necessaria.*"

truths (that is, absolutely speaking, this human power is physically capable of doing this), yet it must also be stated that fallen man, because of the difficulties of the task, is faced with a *moral impotency* to which there corresponds a *moral necessity* of some special help if men are actually to know these natural truths properly.[52]

It has been the will of God to give men the special help needed by including natural truths in the supernatural revelation. Objectively speaking, God could have given this help in some other manner, but He did not chose to do so; thus the moral impotency of mankind is actually removed through divine, supernatural revelation. In this way, the moral impotency of mankind is removed through revelation, and the knowledge of these truths in their totality is again rendered *morally possible* for mankind through faith.[53] It is interesting to note also that this particular Annotation refers explicitly to the passages in the *Summa* of St. Thomas which were discussed above.[54]

In the revised form of the Schema this same doctrine was retained, although expressed in a far more summary form; with minor changes of two phrases, it is this revised form that the Council finally used in order to express its solemn definition.[55] The statement that man's certain and exact knowledge of these natural truths is due to divine revelation is followed by the phrase, directed against the Traditionalists, that one cannot on this account contend that revelation is "absolutely necessary." The Traditionalists, of course, taught that such a revelation was so necessary that

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] *C.L.*, VII, 525, a: "Videlicet per ipsam revelationem tollitur *moralis impotentia*, atque adeo redditur humano generi cognitio *moraliter possibilis.*"

[54] *I*, q. 1, art. 1; *II-II*, q. 2, art. 4. Also: *C. G.*, I, 4; *De veritate*, q. 14, art. 10.

[55] Denz. 1786: Huic divinae revelationi tribuendum quidem est, ut ea, quae in rebus divinis humanae rationi per se impervia non sunt, in praesenti quoque generis humani conditione ab omnibus expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixto errore cognosci possint. Non hac tamen de causa revelatio absolute necessaria dicenda est, sed quia Deus ex infinita bonitate sua ordinavit hominem ad finem supernaturalem, ad participanda scilicet bona divina, quae humanae mentis intelligentiam omnino superant; siquidem *"oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus iis, qui diligunt illum"* [*I Cor.* 2:9]. (Cf. also, *C.L.*, VII, 251, a).

unless God first reveals these natural truths, human reason could not come to know God's existence at all.

However, as Bishop Gasser explains in his discussion of the *emendationes* suggested for this revised form of the Schema, what the Council should intend to teach in this passage is a *moral necessity* that arises not from the object (since the truths can be known by reason alone), but from the *subject:* fallen man.[56] While God did not have to chose to elevate mankind to the supernatural order at all, He nevertheless did so "out of His infinite goodness."[57] Once God freely chose to do this, there arose a moral necessity of revealing to men even these natural truths which are so important to his supernatural destiny and which must be known easily, quickly and with no admixture of error if men are to enter into the way of faith and thus achieve their supernatural goal through co-operating with the grace of God. God's love and mercy, therefore, are the ultimate reason why the divine revelation included not only the supernatural mysteries proper to Christianity, but also those of the natural order.

In saying all of this, Bishop Gasser emphasizes the concern of the Council for existential man and for the individual. Unlike the first paragraph of Chapter Two, the Council here is concerned, he says, *"not* with the *power,* even active, of divine knowledge, but with *actual knowledge* of God, and indeed that God might be known by all men easily, not after a long delay of time and investigation, with a firm certitude even by those who are scarcely capable of grasping the arguments derived from reason; finally that God be known also with no admixture of error. If we are concerned, therefore, with *actual natural knowledge* in these circumstances, so many and such great difficulties hinder man as he now is, that supernatural revelation can be said to be *morally necessary."*[58]

[56] *C.L.,* VII, 135, a.

[57] Denz. 1786 (*C.L.,* VII, 72, b); also Bishop Gasser's comments on Emendatio 18: *C.L.,* VII, 136, a.

[58] *C.L.,* VII, 135, b (italics ours). While in its solemn decrees I Vatican Council did not use the term "moral necessity" in regard to the revelation of natural truths, the phrase does appear in the encyclical of Pius XII, *Humani generis* (N.C.W.C. edition, par. 3): "It is for this reason that divine revelation must be considered morally necessary so that those religious and moral truths which are not of their nature beyond the reach of reason in the present condition of the human race, may be known by all men readily with a firm certainty and with freedom from all error."

It is also interesting to note the truths included in one of the suggested changes, an almost entirely new formula praised by Bishop Gasser, but set aside since it would mean a completely new discussion in the conciliar chambers. The author states that it is due to revelation that men know with certainty and with no mixture of error not only supernatural mysteries, but also natural truths, such as ". . . the existence of God and His attributes, the spirituality and immortality of our soul and the primary principles of morality upon which human society is founded. . . ."[59] This is entirely in keeping with the mind of I Vatican Council and the meaning of the solemn definition eventually issued by it.

There were no changes in this part of the decree from this time on. There were two other *emendationes* following the vote of April 12 concerning the absolute necessity of revelation,[60] but they were both rejected.[61] Hence this section as it then stood was incorporated into the solemn decree of April 24, 1870.

### THE QUESTION OF PREACHING

Viewing this teaching of I Vatican Council in this light, we can return to a consideration of what is the proper approach to be used in attempting to draw modern man to God and in helping to make faith more real and vital for the believer. Judging according to the mind of the Council, we can appreciate the importance of the questions raised by Etienne Gilson from another point of view. In his *Christianity and Philosophy,* Gilson discusses this same topic and asks a very pointed question that deserves more consideration in present circumstances:

> Is it not possible that our pulpits might preach a little less technical philosophy and a little more of the Gospel? I refer here especially to that sort of philosophic inflation which authorizes the dialectical proving of the existence of God, by the first mover, or by the contingent and the necessary, to the faithful assembled for the eleven o'clock Mass? However cultivated and intelligent we may suppose them to be, they are not an audience of metaphysicians. I admit that there has been a general progress in knowledge, but what progress would have had to

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[59] *C.L.,* VII, 121, d (no. 17).
[60] *C.L.,* VII, 225, b (nos. 55½, 56).
[61] *C.L.,* VII, 238, c; 239, b.

be made in order that we should reach that stage, when we recall that in the golden age of theology Saint Thomas found only the *paucissimi* to have the leisure, the desire, the intelligence and the knowledge required by anyone who wished to rise to the level of metaphysics! Having himself to speak one day before the masters and students of the University of Paris on the Apostles' Creed, the Angelic Doctor did not judge it expedient to preach to them technical and complicated proofs of the existence of God. If this select audience did not inspire him with more confidence, would it not be wise to use the same prudence with common men, and tell them: "The first thing that we have to believe is that there is One God only; the second is that this God is the Creator of heaven and earth. . . ."[62]

It is not difficult to see how, as a result of our continual debates with the Rationalists and Semi-Rationalists during the last few centuries, an overemphasis upon purely philosophic concepts might arise. Our attempt to "meet them on their own grounds" may have led us to neglect inadvertently our strongest ground: the ground of faith. Perhaps our current tendency to emphasize the "intellectual Catholic" may be having much the same effect, as necessary as it is to stress the need of Catholics entering into the various fields of true scholarship. Yet this will always remain the task of a comparatively small elite, and it must not be confused with faith. There is a tremendous amount of truth in Gilson's statement that we may have allowed ourselves "to be carried away on the sea of intellectual democracy" so that "we accept the challenge flung down by the world, to demonstrate anything at all to anyone at all."[63] There is, as he hints, a confusion between the "scholarly approach" and "faith." We do not believe God's revelation because He has passed our rigorous tests and shown that His word is *wissenschaftlich* enough to be accepted; nor do we believe the truth of revelation because "all first rate scholars" have concluded that this is what God intended to say. We simply submit ourselves to God's divine authority, linked intimately, as it is, to the divinely-guided magisterium of His Church, the extension of Christ in time and space, through which the words of our Saviour are made present to our ears and the pages of Scripture are interpreted for us.

[62] Etienne Gilson, *Christianity and Philosophy* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939), pp. 74-75.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Possibly there are indications of this same attitude in our tendency to confuse the motives of credibility with faith itself. The motives of credibility are essentially those rational judgments which declare that if one does proceed to faith, he will not be doing violence to human nature; he will be acting in accordance with the dictates of sane reason. Thus it is in these judgments that the reasonableness of the act of faith is rooted.

The act of faith itself, however, is distinct from these judgments concerning the reasonableness of the act of faith. Faith rests not only on any rational judgment of our own, but on the authority of God revealing, which is, as I Vatican Council pointed out, the fundamental motive of faith.[64] It is not a result of philosophic proof, historical study or exegetical research. As the suggested Schema of I Vatican Council pointed out, the insistence on the unique quality of faith was occasioned by those in the nineteenth century who affirmed "that faith itself, by which the revealed truths must be believed, is a natural conviction of reason induced by necessary arguments according to the laws of human science. . . ."[65] This was a dominant concern throughout the entire discussion of this problem at the Council, and it is a clue to the true meaning of this part of the constitution *Dei Filius*.

If we emphasize properly the teaching of I Vatican Council, we can see the primary importance it would attribute to supernatural faith in the life of the Catholic. We may accordingly hesitate somewhat more for fear of reducing our preaching to something which breathes less of the spirit of faith than it ought. Proofs from the pulpit might often be better replaced with a clear presentation of God's revealed truth in a spirit of humble acceptance. There is also something of a danger in preaching metaphysics. To quote Gilson again, "let us remember then, that for the ordinary man there is no difference between a proof which is not conclusive and a proof which he is unable to see is conclusive."[66] It may be that in our appeal to "reason," we sometimes tend to forget this, and may leave the faithful struggling with the question of whether God really exists, man truly has a soul and a free will, or if the soul is immortal, since they could not follow or accept

[64] Denz. 1789, 1811 (*C.L.*, VII, 166, a).
[65] *C.L.*, VII, 510, d (Caput VII).
[66] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

the "proofs from reason" we have preached. It is not the goal of the Church by any means to "reason" men into faith; this simply cannot be done. Moreover, as Gilson adds:

> No man can be made responsible for not understanding what God simply asks him to believe, if he is unable or unwilling to make the effort necessary for achieving its understanding. When, therefore, the objection is put to us that *today* everybody wants proofs, the reply can only be that *today* technical proofs are accessible to everybody. Today as in the 13th century, technical proofs are good for those who can understand them; to those who cannot do so, it is good simply to recall the old saying of Hesiod, cited by Aristotle and commented on by Saint Thomas: "The excellent pupil is one who can learn all alone; the good pupil is one who can learn from others; as for him who can learn neither alone nor from others, he is not made for science."[67]

It is above all by following the directives and the spirit of I Vatican Council that we can give due importance to the role of faith in the lives of individual Catholics. Certainly human reason in itself has the power of coming to know the existence of God and such related truths, but relatively few human beings are able to activate that power, whether from want of time, talent or interest. Faith, however, pertains to a different order; this we need to keep in mind: "To engage in natural theology all those who wish it and yet lack the necessary preparations is to replace faith for all by science for all in those matters in which the voice of God makes itself heard simply because science is then reserved to some."[68] Faith is rooted in the authority of God revealing, and thus the certitude of faith remains untouched by the vagaries of history or exegesis or the waverings of philosophical reason:

> There is reason, therefore, first of all for reminding those who demand metaphysical instruction from the Church, that intellectual modesty is a great virtue and that the first condition, for anyone wishing to approach God by the intelligence, is never to forget that if the intelligence fails us, our faith at least should never do so. Perhaps we might even recall that those only who are qualified for the task ought to attack problems of this kind and that we have no more right to require our first curate to prove to us in five minutes the existence

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[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

of God by demonstrative reason than to require Einstein to prove his system to anyone at all in twenty-four hours. That is not, I am afraid, what we do.[69]

### THE SEARCH FOR GOD

In the light of all of this, we may evaluate the basic problem of modern man and God. It may be justly asked, how is modern man to find God if not above all through that primary means intended by God Himself in his goodness, that is through faith itself. When a man has wandered far from God, when his soul expresses an anguish, even a despair, he is not looking for metaphysics or history; he is seeking a Person. God has actually revealed Himself to mankind, and He continues through His Church to do so today, even in the midst of all the hatred that marks the modern world, even in the face of so many denials. God speaks now within the restless, turbulent heart of today's man; He calls to him, asking only that he look to the proper source, and discover there the true meaning of the sorrow and despair, the evil and the fear, the frustration of life itself that continues to crush him with its weight.

Saint Augustine is, in many ways, the earlier counterpart of today's man. All of the anguish and frustration he knew in his early life was, as it is for men today, nothing more than the cry of man toward his God. For years Augustine tried to satisfy his inner need with other things—with study, with success, with the pleasures of sex. But he knew no lasting peace. He finally cast them all aside, even his Manichean teachers and their philosophy, refusing "to commit the cure of my soul's sickness to them."[70] It was only then, when he had gone down "into the depth of the sea, and . . . lost confidence, and . . . despaired of finding the truth,"[71] that he finally found the truth through faith in God. Augustine knew then what he had been seeking all his life. As he expressed it later in his *Confessions:* "You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you."[72] This is not the man of reason but existential man: the man destined for the beatific

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[70] St. Augustine, *Confessions,* translated by John K. Ryan (New York: Image Books, 1960), Book 5, chap. 14 (p. 132).

[71] *Ibid.*, Book 6, chap. 1 (p. 133).

[72] *Ibid.*, Book 1, chap. 1 (p. 43).

vision alone. To describe man as a rational animal will tell us *what* he is, but faith alone informs us of the reason *why* he is.

The restless heart of which St. Augustine spoke was above all his own, but it was not simply the heart—the symbol—that he meant, but the entire man. Something deep within him had continued to cry out through all those years; nothing else would satisfy that need, that longing; nothing else could silence that voice. It was this that brought on the anguish of Augustine, the saddened, dejected and broken man who fell headlong into the blackened pit, and there beheld the face of God.

The man of our modern world is destined to experience something of this very nature. The longing is obvious; the cry cannot be stifled. But in the service of the Church, we must direct him at once to that fountain of life he needs most of all: to faith. The desire for the world of faith is the most vital and fundamental longing of man's soul; nothing can take its place, and there alone will he discover the meaning of human existence. We may see man's confusion expressed in his nervous, frantic search for any sort of lasting peace and security. It lurks unanswered in the lives of many of our most successful people, some of whom have turned from the plaudits of men to seek, for some unknown reason, the silence of suicide to which their frustration led them; it is written in the faces of the poor who are searching for more than bread; it is engraved on the hearts of modern youth, wandering aimlessly through the streets of our cities, afraid to walk alone and seeking in the code of the gang some answer to the constant gnawing within their troubled souls. It is the yearning of man to comply with the plan of God.

Men may well pretend that God is dead, but this will not silence and has not silenced this inner voice, this insatiable desire. In the midst of all the pleasures of this world, there presses forth this "homesickness for heaven," and the road which leads there is the road of faith alone. In the words of the Psalmist:

> I stretch out my hands to you;
> my soul thirsts for you like parched land.
> Hasten to answer me, O Lord, for my spirit fails me.
> Hide not your face from me, lest I become like those
> who go down into the pit.[73]

[73] *Ps.* 142:6-7.

It is the call of God toward modern man, leading him back through sorrow and despair to the fountain of eternal life which will quench this thirst for the divine.

JOHN L. MURPHY

*The Catholic University of America*
*Washington, D. C.*

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## FIFTY YEARS AGO

The leading article in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for April, 1911, continues the series by Fr. B. Feeney, of St. Paul's Seminary, St. Paul, on seminary studies. In this article the author, in keeping with his general theme, insists that in Dogmatic Theology and Apologetics there should be greater emphasis on the development of the seminarian's own spiritual life. He says: "To make each dogma of the faith a principle of conduct, it must be studied, not only in itself but as the medium or light in which we see ourselves and all created things in our relations to God." . . . M. Nesbitt writes on "Old-Time Holy Week and Easter Customs," particularly in pre-Reformation England, such as the procession on Palm Sunday, when the Blessed Sacrament was solemnly borne from a place outside the city to the parish church, in token of Our Lord's advent into Jerusalem. . . . Fr. F. Valitutti, O.F.M., discusses "The True Year of the Death of Christ," which he considers to be the year 34 A.D., on March 26. . . . George Metlake, writing from Germany on the public school system of that country, points out that the Prussian government regards religion as a most important part of the curriculum and that each child receives instruction according to his particular belief. . . . Fr. E. Richards contributes an article on "Architecture and the Church in the United States." He pleads for improvements in church architecture, claiming that our churches are "monstrosities in stone and stucco that shamefully confess their sins of omission and commission to any man who has eyes in his head." . . . In the Analecta we find a decree of Pope St. Pius X, declaring that one who has been enrolled in a scapular (except those proper to Third Orders) can gain all the benefits attached to the scapular, not excepting the sabbatine privilege of the scapular of Our Lady of Mount Carmel, by wearing a blessed scapular medal. . . . Several letters praise the suggestion that an annual gift be sent to the Holy Father by the clergy of America. Some bishops are quoted in favor of this plan.

F. J. C.

# Answers to Questions

## ASSISTING AT MASS BY TELEVISION

*Question:* Can a person who watches a televised Mass with devotion be regarded as actually assisting at the Mass so that he can gain the same spiritual benefits he would receive if he were actually in church?

*Answer:* I believe that an affirmative answer can be given, at least as a probable opinion. However, in order to forestall the first objection that would arise in the mind of the average clerical reader, let me state emphatically that I am not saying that by viewing a Mass on the television screen a Catholic fulfills his duty of assisting at Mass on a Sunday or a holyday. That is something entirely different. By the law of the Church a Catholic must be *corporeally* present on Sundays and holydays in order to satisfy the obligation.

What I mean is this: By the marvelous medium of television I believe that a person can acquire a form of true presence at the event that he sees or hears—not a *corporeal* presence, but what might be called a *facultative* presence. The faculties of sight and hearing truly perceive what is presented on the screen, however far away it may be taking place. After all, when I see something happening even in the normal way, the occurrence does not enter my eyes. It is only a species or image that I really perceive, brought to me by light waves. Now is it not substantially the same on a wider scale when the television apparatus provides me with an image of some occurrence brought a great distance by the scientific channelling of electro-magnetic waves? Similarly, I believe that we can be said to hear the very voice of the person who delivers a speech over the radio. Of course, this would hold only when there is a live broadcast or telecast. If the event has been taped or recorded, then it is only the image of the past event or the recording of the voice that I see or hear. In ordinary speech we imply this facultative presence at a live telecast. "I saw the inauguration on television" we say, as distinct from "I saw a rebroadcast of the inauguration."

A decision of the Sacred Penitentiary, in virtue of faculties granted by Pope Pius XII, promulgated on May 9, 1952, lends some weight to this opinion. Two questions were asked by the Procurator General of the Dominicans—first, whether the faithful who recite the Rosary with a companion *who is present only radiophonically* can thereby gain the indulgences attached to the Rosary; second, whether the indulgences can be gained if the radio part of the prayers is broadcast from a recording. The answer to the first was affirmative, to the second negative (Bouscaren, *Canon Law Digest,* III, p. 390). Of course, we are here concerned with a matter that ultimately depends on the will of the Church; but it would seem that there is a real foundation for this distinction. In other words, the person making the broadcast is in some way *truly heard* by those who listen to the broadcast. Indeed, the first question used the words *radiophonically present.* I have received support from a scientist who informs me that the light waves by which I normally perceive an object differ from the electro-magnetic waves which are used in radio and television only in wave length.

The consequences of this opinion are very important from the standpoint of the problem we are considering. A person can derive great benefit from the Holy Sacrifice even if he is united to it only by affection. Such is the case of the devout invalid, who at the time Mass is being celebrated in the town church reads his Missal or says his Rosary, directing his thoughts to the Holy Sacrifice. But he is not in any sense really present. I believe it is different when he views the Mass actually being celebrated and transmitted to his room by television. In such a case, according to my opinion, he is truly assisting by a physical bond at the Mass, and consequently can gain the same graces that are conferred on those who are in the church. And those who assist at a Mass are more richly blessed than those who are linked to it only morally by affection.

It would not necessarily follow from this that sacramental absolution can be given by television or radio or telephone. For in the administration of this sacrament it would seem that *corporeal* presence of the penitent and the confessor is necessary. That at least is the more common view. Nevertheless, this is not certain. On the only occasion when the question of absolution by telephone was proposed to the Holy See, the Sacred Penitentiary, on July 1,

1884 answered: *Nihil esse respondendum.* It is interesting to note that Regatillo-Zalba regard it as probable that absolution can be given by telephone, and approved this practice during the Mexican persecution (Regatillo-Zalba, *Theologiae moralis summa,* III, n. 379).

At any rate, I believe that the many good people in our land who are confined to their homes and prayerfully and piously view a televised Mass on Sunday can be encouraged and consoled by knowing that probably they are actually assisting at the Holy Sacrifice, in a manner similar to the presence of those who are in church. But it should be emphasized, particularly for the benefit of other members of the family who might look on this as an adequate substitute for their presence in church, that assistance by television does not satisfy their Sunday and feastday obligation. I believe that the Church could decree that such assistance would fulfill the obligation. In fact, I have heard that in the course of the Spanish Civil War the Church allowed Catholics of that land to fulfill their duty by hearing Mass on the radio. But, as far as I know, no concession of this kind exists anywhere today.

## MORAL PROBLEMS OF PLASTIC SURGERY

*Question:* What is the answer of Catholic theology to some of the problems encountered by the plastic surgeon? For example, what is the basic theological principle permitting such surgery? What should a doctor do when a person seeks some form of surgery apparently with the intention of disguising himself and thus evading the clutches of the law? What should a surgeon do if a woman requests an operation for the enlargement of her breasts?

*Answer:* This question was proposed by a conscientious Catholic doctor who specializes in plastic surgery. Fortunately we have an official papal pronouncement on this subject—a discourse of Pope Pius XII to the Italian Society of Plastic Surgery, delivered only five days before his death (*AAS,* L [1958], 952-61). The principles laid down in this address together with those contained in a previous discourse of the Holy Father to the Convention on the "histopathology of the nervous system" held in 1952 (*AAS,* XLIV [1952], 779-89) furnish an answer to the doctor's problems.

In the earlier allocution the Pope explained the "principle of totality," according to which a person may destroy or mutilate

(by himself or through others) portions of his body for the benefit of the whole, to save his life and to avoid or to repair injuries which could not otherwise be avoided or repaired. This would answer the question proposed above as to the basic theological principle permitting plastic surgery.

For a further solution of the problems that a surgeon may encounter, we must distinguish two purposes which this type of surgery may aim at attaining—first, to remedy a defect, either congenital or caused by an accident; second, to improve a person's appearance. As to the first reason, there should be no difficulty. Everyone has a right to employ those medical or surgical means that will make him normal. Hence, a person who has suffered defacement through a fire or other form of accident can seek to have these defects corrected by the plastic surgeon. Again, if a person was born with a distorted nose or ears that jut out abnormally or a harelip, it is perfectly lawful for him to seek a remedy in plastic surgery. It is interesting to note that Pope Pius XII singled out surgery for the repair of the lips and of the nose as particularly characteristic of modern surgical skill (*AAS,* L [1958], 953). Indeed, the Pope draws an analogy between the creative act of God in forming the first man from the slime of earth, and the skillful technique of the plastic surgeon striving to restore some portion of the body to its normal physical perfection.

But what of the use of plastic surgery, not to correct a defect, but to add further beauty to a person who is already normal? I believe this, too, can be justified. The principle pertaining to this problem is thus briefly stated by Fr. Lawrence McCreavy, of England: "Even when a person of aesthetically normal appearance seeks to have his or her features improved by plastic surgery out of mere regard for aesthetic perfection, there is nothing intrinsically either good or bad in the object, and consequently its morality will depend on the circumstances of the concrete instance" (*Clergy Review,* XLIV, 9 [Sept. 1959], 353-55).

Father McCreavy has repeated the ideas of Pope Pius XII who, in his discourse to the plastic surgeons, stated: "The physical beauty of man, manifested principally in the face, is in itself a good, though subordinated to higher goods, and as such worth seeking and desiring. In fact, it is an imprint of the beauty of the Creator, a perfection of the human composite, a normal symptom

of physical health. . . . If an individual seeks from esthetic surgery the perfecting of his appearance, although it is already in conformity with the norms of beauty, and has no bad intention . . . such a desire or act is in itself neither morally good or evil, but receives its moral value from the circumstances" (*AAS*, L [1958], 957-58).

The Holy Father goes on to point out the circumstances that will determine the lawfulness of the particular operation—the intention must be good, the general health of the subject must be protected, the motives must be reasonable and proportionate to the extraordinary means to which recourse is being had. For example, it is evident that a surgical procedure is wrong if it is directed toward increasing one's power of seduction and thus more easily inducing others to sin, or if it is exclusively intended to protect a criminal from justice, or if it harms the regular functioning of the physical organs, or if it is desired through mere vanity or caprice.

From this preamble we can answer the two other questions of the good doctor. It surely would be unlawful for a surgeon to alter the appearance of a criminal in order to help him evade the police—at least, when there is reason to fear that he intends to continue his criminal career. As far as the natural law is concerned, it might not be wrong to help a criminal escape capture if he is determined to avoid crime in future; but a doctor who would attempt this would be liable to punishment by civil law as an accomplice *post factum*. On the other hand, if there was question of helping an innocent victim of a tyrannical government to escape —for example, a good man fleeing the persecution of a Communist government—a surgeon could lawfully apply his art to aid the escape of this innocent person.

Finally, when there is question of mammaplasty for the purpose of augmentation, some distinctions must be made. If a woman's breasts are underdeveloped, it would be lawful to make use of surgery to augment them, for everyone has a right to be normal. On the other hand, if the woman wants so exaggerated a degree of augmentation as to attract everyone's attention and is evidently seeking to excite sexual thoughts in the minds of those who see her, a doctor would be sinning by co-operation who would fulfill her wishes. But within the scope of what is normal in this matter

I believe there can be diversity of degrees, and I would not accuse a surgeon of sinning if he developed the woman's breasts to a degree above what is usual but still can be called normal. Of course, she might be seeking such an operation for sinful purposes, but on the other hand she might have good motives, such as to get a good husband by making herself more attractive or to hold the husband she already has. The doctor would not be obliged to ask the woman's motives in this case, but could presume they are honorable unless the opposite is proved.

I might add that I regard the operation of face-lifting as permissible. It might be objected that there is a measure of deception involved in this procedure, since it is intended to give the subject a more youthful appearance than her (or his) years actually warrant. But I regard it in the same category as the use of a wig—and who will accuse a person (man or woman) of sin by having recourse to this innocent (and often evident) form of deception?

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

## MOTETS DURING LOW MASS

*Question:* The recent Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of Rites on Sacred Music and the Liturgy restricts quite drastically the playing of the organ at low Mass. Can we say that the letter or the spirit of the Instruction would impose the same restrictions on the singing of motets during low Mass?

*Answer:* Canon J. B. O'Connell, in his commentary on the Instruction of Sept. 3, 1958, says, with regard to n. 30: ". . . not any kind of prayers or hymns may be used, they must be such as to be in accord with the part of the Mass at which they are used. It is not a desirable practice to sing Latin liturgical texts during low Mass while the celebrant is saying them—this should be reserved for high Mass—and there should be neither prayer aloud nor singing during the presidential parts of the rite which are said aloud by the priest (the Collect, Preface, Postcommunion) (note: Communal prayers and chants must not relegate the celebrant into the background). Similarly, they should be avoided during Epistle and Gospel and from the Consecration till after *Pater noster* (n. 14*c*). . . . *Cantus* in n. 30 is a term that includes not only hymns but psalms. These are especially appropriate when

chosen to accord with the psalms used in the formulary of the Mass of the day (cf. n. 27*b, c*) and nowadays can be sung—even in the vernacular—to a special responsorial chant (the Gelineau method)."

Since a motet is "a polyphonic choral composition on a sacred text, usually without instrumental accompaniment," it would seem to have a proper place in a low Mass but with the restrictions O'Connell sets down.

## THE ANGELUS BELL

*Question:* I would be extremely thankful for information pertaining to the exact date on which the ringing of Angelus bells was ordered by King Louis XI of France. If my memory serves me right, it was this Monarch who first introduced the custom of ringing church bells for the *"Angelus Domini nuntiavit Mariae."*

*Answer:* The history of the Angelus and of the ringing of the Angelus bell is extremely complicated. It is, in fact, impossible, in the present state of our knowledge, to mark a clear beginning of the custom. The action of King Louis XI of France, to which you refer, took place in 1472 when he ordered that throughout his kingdom, at noon, the *Ave Maria* be recited for the peace of the realm. He referred to the ringing of the great bell of a church in Paris. But there is a reference to the recitation of the *Ave Maria* at the sounding of the bell (after Compline) in the time of Pope Clement V (in 1314). A letter, dated 1317, mentions the *Angelus*. The first authentic papal document attesting to the custom comes from the reign of John XXII and is dated Oct. 13, 1318. This document approves the practice of reciting on the knees three Hail Marys when the bell sounds. Another decree of the same Pope, dated May 7, 1327, prescribed the introduction of the *Angelus* at Rome. In the history of the custom, there is great confusion of curfew bells, bells rung in connection with the monastic recitation of parts of the Divine Office, and bells ordered specifically for prayer by the faithful at large. There is further confusion of the *Ave Maria* and the *Angelus* as we know it. Cf. *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie,* I, part 2, cols. 2068-2078, s.v. *Angelus;* and *The Catholic Encyclopedia,* I, pp. 486-487, s.v. Angelus, and pp. 487-488, s.v. Angelus Bell.

## LECTOR'S BLESSING OF BREAD AND NEW FRUIT

*Question:* According to Canon 1147 and as stated in the Rite of Ordination, a minor cleric who has received the order of lector may validly and licitly bless bread and all new fruits. Does such a cleric, in giving this blessing, use the formula which is given in the *Rituale Romanum,* and does he trace the sign of the cross with his hand over the object as the rubrics of the *Rituale* direct?

*Answer:* The lector imparts the blessing of bread and fruit according to the formula given in the *Rituale Romanum,* omitting the *Dominus vobiscum* and its response. He would therefore make the sign of the cross over the object as the rubrics direct (Cf. Vermeersch-Creusen, *Epitome Iuris Canonici,* II, p. 284).

## FUNERAL ABSOLUTION DURING THE SACRUM TRIDUUM

*Question:* With regard to the last three days of Holy Week when funeral Masses are prohibited, now that the services have been transferred to the evening, have any instructions been issued as to when the absolution of the body may take place at church, and whether it must take place? Does the presence of the Blessed Sacrament in the repository on Friday alter the rite or site of the absolution of the corpse?

*Answer:* As far as I can discover, no instructions have been issued to cover the new situation arising from the OHS. It would seem that the absolution should be given in the morning when there would be no danger of conflict with the Holy Week ceremonies. In fact, if the true spirit of the reformed rite is followed, not even on Good Friday would there be need to alter the rite or site of the absolution. Father Bugnini, C.M., writes: "In our opinion and, if we do not mistake, in accordance with the spirit of the restored rite, the adoration should cease at midnight of Thursday. . . . Therefore at the altar of reposition all the lights except one should be extinguished and the Holy Eucharist should be reserved in the repository as it is ordinarily in the tabernacle" (*Eph. Lit.* LXX [1956], p. 157; cf. also p. 142).

## DIRECTIONS FOR CONGREGATION AT SUNG MASSES

*Question:* Would you kindly tell us if there are any regulations directing the congregation's movements during sung Masses? For example, just before the Gospel, should the people stand while the altar boy is changing the Missal and the priest is reciting the *Munda Cor Meum* or should they wait until the priest intones *Dominus vobiscum?* Should they wait until the priest intones *per omnia saecula saeculorum* immediately preceding the preface or should they stand while he is still reciting the Secret? Does the Congregation wait until the celebrant sings *per omnia,* etc. before the *Pater Noster* or should the people stand while he is reciting the prayer immediately preceding?

*Answer:* Although the new code of rubrics makes no mention of the *circumstantes* or congregation in "The Order of Kneeling, Sitting and Standing at Mass" (Chap. X, nn. 517-524), it would be well for the faithful generally, especially in view of the movement toward active participation, to follow the directions given for those in choir, i.e., those assisting in the sanctuary, as follows:

"520. In the choir, those who are not prelates kneel at the *Confiteor* with its psalm and at the celebrant's blessing at the end of the Mass. . . .

"521. Moreover all, including prelates, kneel in choir:

a) at the consecration;

b) at the communion of the faithful;

c) in the Masses of the ferias of Advent, Lent and Passiontide, of the Ember Days in September, of vigils of the 2nd and 3rd class outside of Paschaltide, and in Masses of the dead: at the collects before the epistle, when the *Dominus vobiscum* has been said; from the end of the *Sanctus* up to but not including the *Pater noster* with its preface; and at the postcommunion prayers and the prayer over the people;

d) whenever words which require a genuflection are sung by the ministers or by the choir.

"522. Likewise in choir all genuflect on one knee:

a) while the celebrant recites the words of the creed *Et incarnatus est* etc.;

b) while he says the words of the last gospel *Et verbum caro factum est.*

"524. In the choir those who are actually singing do not sit, but the rest may sit:

a) when the celebrant is sitting;

b) while the lessons and the epistle, the gradual, the tract and the *Alleluia* with its verse, and the sequence are being sung;

c) from the offertory until the incensing of the choir or, if the choir is not incensed, until the preface;

d) from the end of the communion until the *Dominus vobiscum* before the postcommunion.

At other times they stand, genuflect or kneel, as above" (Liturgical Press trans.).

At a solemn Mass, the priest no longer recites the *Munda cor meum* or sings the Gospel; at a *missa cantata,* the people should rise as the priest moves to the Gospel side, a moment before the *Dominus vobiscum.* At a solemn Mass or at a *cantata* with incense (now permitted without indult), the people will already be standing at the *per omnia* of the preface; at a *cantata* without incense, they rise at the intonation. At a festive solemn Mass or festive *cantata,* the people will already be standing when *per omnia* introduces the *Pater noster;* on the occasions listed in n. 521, *c,* the people will rise when the priest begins the *per omnia.*

JOHN P. MCCORMICK, S.S.

# Book Reviews

SEVEN BOOKS OF WISDOM. By Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1960.

*Seven Books of Wisdom,* by Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm., is a welcome addition to the steady stream of scholarly works pouring from the pens of Catholic Scripturists. While this title will not have the effect of stimulating controversy, it will spread light on an area only superficially visited by those who attempt to broaden the base of their scriptural studies. The work will be introductory for many, but it is bound to focus the blurred concepts of those who might suspect that the material is simply the new arrangement of old themes. Father Murphy's greatest contribution in his latest work is not to be construed as "the old to advantage dressed," but rather "what oft was thought but ne'er so well expressed." *Seven Books of Wisdom* might rightly be considered a path through the wisdom literature in much the same sense as Bruce Vawter's *Path Through Genesis.* Readers will discover the author a competent, knowledgeable guide more concerned with instructing them than in enjoying the trip himself. They will note that the work is meant to be a companion to the Sacred Text and not to be read in its own isolation.

The author adheres to a warning given in the preface that the work would be a popular presentation. The mode of treatment, the depth of insight and the integration of the theme remain constant throughout. There are no weaker or stronger chapters. All are solid pieces with no traces of vulgarization or engagement in idle speculation. To the uninitiated the chapter on Hebrew poetry will be particularly useful. The orientation offered will disabuse the reader of many preconceived ideas and lay the foundation on which he can build his concepts. The familiar refrain of the modern scholar to examine ideas against their own background and not in the framework of our times finds a constant application in wisdom literature. The notions of parallelism so frequently misunderstood, overlooked, or simply taken for granted, and the concepts embodied in the term *mashal* or proverb are amply illustrated. A close study of the chapter will provide a note of caution to one who tends to see all trees and no forest, and a note of encouragement to one who tends to see all forest and no trees.

Father Murphy expounds in turn Proverbs, Psalms, Job, The Canticle of Canticles, Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom. In each chapter

he arrives at the heart of the matter quickly and surely. His delineations of material leave no doubt as to what is important. He is didactic with the didactic. Chapter Nine entitled "Wisdom in the Old Testament" serves as the unifying and integrating element of the book. The reviewer makes bold to suggest that it be read immediately after Chapter One and be reread in its proper place. The concluding remarks of the author are a bridge between the Testaments and might well serve as a preface to a companion volume on the wisdom literature of the New Testament.

*Seven Books of Wisdom* has the traits of the serpent and the dove. It has the simplicity of depth and the depth of simplicity. Its presentation is popular as will be its acceptance. The reviewer recommends it unhesitatingly to seminarians desirous of making their way profitably through one large segment of the Old Testament, to graduates in schools of Religious Education, to students of College Theology, to teachers in the CCD programs, to priest-teachers and lecturers and to modern readers who welcome books that have an impact.

GERALD T. KENNEDY, O.M.I.

LIFE AFTER DEATH. By Maurice Becqué and Louis Becqué. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1960. Pp. 125. $2.95.

This short work is a marvellous and sympathetic attempt to bring the peace and hope of Christ's Redemption to the tortured souls of today's children of confusion. It is written by two Belgian Redemptorists and it is obviously aimed at the young followers of Sartrian existentialism who are so prominent in France today, and at the idealistic followers of Marxian Communism who are so upset by the social injustices they see around them. It is also meant for those semi-Christians who see salvation as an impersonal social phenomenon and it attempts to show them "how best to combine one's own salvation with concern for the salvation of others." But whether the authors intended it or not, it also has something to say to all of us who are living in the turmoil of this twentieth century and can not help but imbibe some of its secularism and pessimism, even though we are not aware that this has happened to us.

The book is divided into two equal parts, each half consisting of three sections. Surprising as this may seem, it is only in the second half of the book that we find a treatment of Christ's message about life after death. The first part of the book deals almost exclusively with non-Christian attitudes toward the hereafter. The authors, devi-

ating from the traditional theological approach, start with an examination of contemporary expressions of man's yearning for unending life as these are found in literature and philosophy today. Needless to say the examples cited are very short and limited to a few authors—Camus, Sartre, Sagan, Mauriac, de Beauvoir, Heidigger, Jaspers and a few others; but the examples are used very well and the authors succeed in proving their point, namely, that contemporary man has a yearning for eternal life and his failure to find a way of satisfying it has made him anxious, neurotic (if not psychotic) and in general extremely pessimistic and dissatisfied with life as he knows it. The sympathy of the authors for these tortured souls is worthy of note.

The next section does revert to the traditional approach. It treats of all the religions of mankind (briefly of course) and shows that man has always had a belief in the hereafter. The section is well-done, but to this reviewer's mind, it does not really appeal to the audience for whom this work is intended. Pessimists are usually convinced that everybody else is wrong anyway, so that pointing out to them what everybody else thinks does not affect them very much. Protestant belief is briefly treated here but in too cursory and general a fashion. The appeal for a return to the true fold with which the section ends could well have been dispensed with.

In the second half of the book the teachings of Christ in regard to life after death are finally set forth, and in general in a very logical and appealing way. Once again brevity is a bit of a handicap but nevertheless the section reads fairly easily (with two very notable exceptions) and does manage to make heaven somewhat appealing. Israel's longing, Christ's preaching, and the theology of heaven are treated in rapid succession. The fact of the Kingdom of Heaven being within us and among us here on earth is well brought out and made quite meaningful. (Canon Thils' ideas about the twofold division of eschatological times are apparently being used, and to good effect.) The difficult sections are those in which scholastic philosophy is used to explain the theology of the last things. The treatment is brief and accurate of course, but it is hard to see how it will mean much to a reader of this book not well trained in scholastic terminology. The lapses into scholastic exposition are few but they do mar the work.

Finally the sufferings of the future life are treated and here again the sympathy of the authors for the sensibilities of modern men is manifest. But there is no watering down of realities, even though the most moderate views possible are set forth. The way is paved for this section by some wonderful pages on Christ overcoming suffering and

death and on the importance of personal salvation as well as for improvement in the community of mankind considered collectively.

This reviewer found the book very rewarding reading, mostly because it engendered sympathy for souls tortured by the lack of modern answers to life's most perplexing problems. It is certainly not the last word on the subject, but it is written in the right frame of mind, and for that it deserves to be studied.

BERNARD O'KEEFE

# Books Received

LITURGY AND DOCTRINE. By Charles Davis. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961. Pp. 123. $2.50.

THE MARY OF SAINT MARTIN'S. THE LIFE OF MOTHER DEMETRIAS, FOUNDRESS OF THE MISSION HELPERS OF THE SACRED HEART. By John C. Murrett, M.M. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. 187. $3.50.

SELF EVALUATION IN THE MINOR SEMINARY. By Cornelius M. Cuyler, S.S., Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961. Pp. 70. $1.50.

THE EUCHARIST SACRAMENT. By Francis Wengier. Stevens Point, Wis.: The Author, 1960. Pp. xxii + 328. $5.00.

JOHN CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. Volumes 1 & 2. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Philadelphia, Pa.: The Westminster Press, 1961. Pp., Vol. 1, lxxi + 849; Vol. 2, 850-1734. $12.50 (for two volumes).

WITH ANXIOUS CARE. By Felix D. Duffey, C.S.C. St. Louis: Herder, 1961. Pp. ix + 125. $2.75.

EVERYMAN'S ST. PAUL. THE MEANING OF THE EPISTLES. By Vincent P. McCorry, S.J. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961. Pp. 215. $3.95.

FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE'S NUNS. By Emmeline Garnett. New York: Vision Books, 1961. Pp. 185. $1.95.

POPE PIUS XII. By Louis de Wohl. New York: Vision Books, 1961. Pp. 190. $1.95.

WHOM GOD HATH NOT JOINED. By Claire McCauley. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. 159. $3.00.

THE MIND OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT. By Owen Chadwick. California: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. 239. $4.25.

SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. By H. A. Guy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961. Pp. vii + 183. $3.50.

HANDBOOK FOR THE NEW RUBRICS. By Frederick R. McManus. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. 203. $4.50.

RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GREGORIO AGLIPAY, 1860-1960. Vol. I: 1860-1940. By Pedro S. de Achutegui, S.J. and Miguel A. Bernad, S.J. Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 1960. Pp. xvi + 580. $7.50; Paper $4.00.

CATHOLICISM AND REASON. By Edward J. Hayes and Paul J. Hayes. New York: Vantage Press, 1961. Pp. 114. $3.00.

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TEACHING THE CATHOLIC CATECHISM, WITH THE RELIGION WORKBOOK. VOL. III: LIFE IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOD'S COMMANDMENTS. By Josef Goldbrunner. New York: Herder & Herder, 1961. Pp. 122. $1.65.

CHRISTIANITY AND ECONOMICS. By Christopher Hollis. New York: The Hawthorn Books, 1961. Pp. 112. $3.50.

THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS. By Francis Dvornik. New York: The Hawthorn Books, 1961. Pp. 112. $3.50.

THE CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT DIALOGUE. By Jean Bosc, Jean Guitton, Jean Danielou. Translated by Robert J. Olsen. Baltimore, Md.: The Helicon Press, 1961. Pp. ix + 138. $3.50.

HISTOIRE DE L'ÉGLISE. APRÈS LE CONCILE DE TRENTE. LA RESTAURATION CATHOLIQUE, 1563-1648. By Léopold Willaert, S.J. Tournai: Bloud & Gay, 1960. Pp. 492. No price given.

DIEU ET LE BONHEUR DU CHRÉTIEN. By André Combes. Paris: Les Éditions du Cèdre, 1961. Pp. 93. No price given.

PAROLE, ÉGLISE ET SACREMENTS DANS LE PROTESTANTISME ET LE CATHOLICISME. By Louis Bouyer. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961. Pp. 94. No price given.

AMERICAN CATHOLICISM AND THE INTELLECTUAL IDEAL. By Francis L. Christ and Gerard E. Sherry. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1961. Pp. xxv + 318. $2.35.

TO LIVE IS CHRIST. NATURE AND GRACE IN THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By R. W. Gleason, S.J. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. xl + 180. $3.00.

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BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY. By M. Du Buit, O.P. Translated by Kathleen Pond. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961. Pp. 110. $3.50.

THE PROPHETS. By Joseph Dheilly. Translated by Rachel Attwater. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961. Pp. 158. $3.50.

A PRIEST FOREVER. By Francis J. Ripley. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. x + 233. $3.95.

GAUGING SERMON EFFECTIVENESS. By Sylvester F. Macnutt, O.P. Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1960. Pp. xv + 139. $1.95.

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LE LIEU THÉOLOGIQUE "HISTOIRE." By Jean-Marie Levasseur. Trois-Rivières: Éditions du Bien Public, 1960. Pp. 231. No price given.

FROM SHADOWS TO REALITY. By Jean Danielou, S.J. Translated by Dom Wulstan Hibberd. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. vi + 296. $5.50.

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